dispossession are usually invisible. The natives, marked for uprooting and dislocation, simultaneously are divested of their human and national reality and classed as a marginal non-entity. Indeed, Zionist historiography provides ample evidence suggesting that from the very beginning of the Zionist Yishuv (settlement) in Palestine the attitude of the majority of the Zionist groups toward the native Arab population ranged from a mixture of indifference and patronizing superiority, to outright denial of their national rights, and uprooting and transferring them to neighbouring countries. Leading figures such as Israel Zangwill, a prominent Anglo-Jewish writer, a close lieutenant of Theodor Herzl (the founder of political Zionism) and propagator of the transfer solution, worked relentlessly to propagandize the slogan that Palestine was "a land without a people for a people without a land." A reference to the same notion of an "empty country" was made in 1914 by Chaim Weizmann, later president of the World Zionist Congress and the first president of the State of Israel: "In its initial stage, Zionism was conceived by its pioneers as a movement wholly depending on mechanical factors: there is a country which happens to be called Palestine, a country without a people, and, on the other hand, there exists the Jewish people, and it has no country. What else is necessary, then, than to fit the gem into the ring, to unite this people with this country?"1

More revealing, however, is the anecdote Weizmann once told to Arthur Ruppin, the head of the colonization department of the Jewish Agency, about how he (Weizmann) obtained the Balfour Declaration in 1917. When Ruppin asked what he thought about the indigenous Palestinians, Weizmann said: "The British told us that there are some hundred thousand negroes ["kushim"] and for those there is no value."2 A few years after the Zionist movement obtained the Balfour Declaration, Zangwill wrote: "If Lord Shaftesbury was literally inexact in describing Palestine as a country without a people, he was essentially correct, for there is no Arab people living in intimate fusion with the country, utilising its resources and stamping it with a characteristic impress; there is at best an Arab encampment."3 This and other pronouncements by Weizmann and other leading Zionists embodying European supremacy planted in the Zionist mind the racist notion of an empty territory--empty not necessarily in the actual absence of its inhabitants, but rather a kind of civilisational barrenness--justifying Zionist colonisation, and obliviousness to the fate of the native population and their eventual removal.

The same myth of "empty territory" ("a land without a people for a people without a land") runs through Zionist state education in Israel and finds strong expression in children's literature. One such work for children contains the following excerpt:

Joseph and some of his men thus crossed the land [Palestine] on foot, until they reached Galilee. They climbed mountains, beautiful but empty mountains, where nobody lived....Joseph said, "We want to establish this Kibbutz and conquer this emptiness. We shall call this place Tel Hai [Living Hill]....The land is empty; its children have deserted it [reference is, of course, to Jews]. They are dispersed and no longer tend it. No one protects or tends the land now."4
In a similar vein, Israel’s leading satirist, Dan Ben-Amotz, observed in 1982 that "the Arabs do not exist in our textbooks [for children]. This is apparently in accordance with the Jewish-Zionist-socialist principles we have received. "A-people-without-a-land-returns-to-a-land-without-people." In October 1991 Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, in his address to the Madrid Peace Conference, resorted to quoting from the *Innocents Abroad* by Mark Twain (who visited Palestine in 1867 and whose description of its natives was either marked by invective or humorously pejorative), to prove that Palestine was an empty territory, a kind of civilisational barrenness that (in - a silent, 

6 The same myth of Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu to justify Zionist colonisation of Palestine and the obliviousness to the fate of its native inhabitants.7 only justified Zionist settlement but also helped to suppress conscience-pricking among Israeli Jews for the dispossession of the Palestinians before, during, and after 1948 and since 1967: if the land had been empty, then no Zionist wrongdoing had taken place.

The United States Ambassador to Israel, James McDonald, in his book *My Mission in Israel, 1948-1951*,8 tells of a conversation he had with the first President of Israel, Chaim Weizmann, in -Gurion, and Foreign Minister Moshe

In fact, Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion (the first Prime Minisiter and Defence Minister) and Moshe Sharett, 1937-

Sharett, and Ben-importance Ben-Gurion, in particular, attached not merely to transfer but forced transfer is seen in his diary entry of 12 July 1937:

The compulsory transfer of Arabs from the valleys of the proposed Jewish state could give us something which we never had, even when we stood on our own feet during the days of the First and Second Temple-[a Galilee free of Arab population].9

Ben-themselves to Transjordan. He also believed that if the Zionists were determined in their effort to be implemented:

We have to stick to this conclusion in the same way we grabbed the Balfour Declaration, more than that, in the same way we grabbed Zionism itself. We have to insist upon this conclusion [and push it] with our full determination, power and conviction......We must uproot from our hearts the assumption that the thing is not possible. It can be done. Ben-

[emphasis in the original].10

t to which transfer had become associated in his mind with expulsion. Ben-Gurion wrote:
We must expel Arabs and take their places......and, if we have to use force-not to dispossess the Arabs of the Negev and Transjordan, but to guarantee our own right to settle in those places-then we have force at our disposal.\textsuperscript{11}

At the Twentieth Zionist Congress, held from 3 t 21 August 1937, Ben-Gurion emphasised that transfer of Arab villagers had been practised by the Yishuv all along:

Was the transfer of the Arabs ethical, necessary and practicable?.....Transfer of Arabs had repeatedly taken place before in consequence of Jews settling in different district.\textsuperscript{12}

The Hebrew State will discuss with the neighbouring Arab states the matter of voluntarily transferring Arab tenant farmers, workers and fellahin from the Jewish state to neighbouring states. For that purpose the Jewish state, or a special company.....will purchase lands in neighbouring states for the resettlement of all those workers and fellahin.\textsuperscript{13}

Ben-

We have to examine, first, if this transfer is practical, and secondly, if it is necessary. It is impossible to imagine general evacuation without compulsion, and brutal compulsion.......The possibility of a large-scale transfer of a population by force was demonstrated, when the Greeks and the Turks were transferred [after the First World War]. In the present war [Second World War] the idea of transferring a population is gaining more sympathy as a practical and the most secure means of solving the dangerous and painful problem of national minorities. The war has already brought the resettlement of many people in eastern and southern Europe, and in the plans for post-war settlements the idea of a large-scale population transfer in central, eastern, and southern Europe increasingly occupies a respectable place.\textsuperscript{14}

Ben-Gurion went on to suggest a Zionist-inspired campaign in England and the US that would aim Yishuv in implementing transfer schemes of Palestinian Arabs from Palestine in return for economic gains.\textsuperscript{15}

Ben-Gurion entered the 1948 war with a mind-set and premeditation to expel Palestinians. Ben-Gurion advised on 19 December 1947 that we [the Haganah] adopt the system of aggressive defence; during the assault we must respond with a decisive blow: the destruction of the [Arab] place or the expulsion of the residents along with the seizure of the place.\textsuperscript{16}

In early February 1948 Ben-Gurion told Yosef Weitz:

and in war they lose their whole meaning.\textsuperscript{17}

The 1948 Palestinian refugee exodus was the culmination of over half a century of efforts, secret plans and (in the end) brute force. From the beginning of the Zionist enterprise to found a Jewish National Home, or state, in Palestine, the Zionists had been confronted with what they - the fact that Palestine was already populated. One of the proposed - a euphemism denoting the organised removal

\textbf{In the pre-}
1948 period, the transfer concept was embraced by the highest level of leadership, including virtually all the founding fathers of the Israeli state and representing almost the entire political spectrum. Nearly all the founding fathers advocated transfer in one form or another, including Theodor Herzl, Leon Motzkin, Nahman Syrkin, Menahem Ussishkin, Chaim Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, Yitzhak Tabenkin, Avraham Granovsky, Israel Zangwill, Yitzhak Ben-Tzvi, Pinhas Rutenberg, Aaron Aaronson, Zeev Zabotinsky, and Berl Katznelson. Katznelson, who was one of the most popular and influential leaders of the Mapai party (later the ruling Labour party), is often described by liberal Israelis as the conscience of Labour Zionism. He had this to say in a debate at labour movement), in August 1937:

The matter of population transfer has provoked a debate among us: Is it permitted or forbidden? My conscience is absolutely clear in this respect. A remote neighbour is better than a close enemy. They [the Palestinians] will not lose from it. In the final analysis, this is a political and settlement reform for the benefit of both parties. I have long been of the opinion that this is the best of all solutions........I have always believed and still believe that they were destined to be transferred to Syria or Iraq.18

What is a compulsory transfer?.. Compulsory transfer does not mean individual transfer. It means that once we resolved to transfer there should be a political body able to force this or that Arab who would not want to move out. Regarding the transfer of Arab individuals we are always doing this. But the question will be the transfer of much greater quantity of Arabs through an agreement with the Arab states: this is called a compulsory transfer.....We have here a war about principles, and in the same way that we must wage a war for insist on the principle that it must be a large agreed transfer.19

In the early 1940s Katznelson found time to be engaged in polemics with the left-wing Hashomer Hatzair rule it beforehand.

Has [kibbutz] Merhaviyah not been built on transfer? Were it not for many of these transfers been set up.20

-founder of Brit Shalom, a movement advocating binationalism and equal rights for Arabs and Jews; moderate Mapai leaders such as Golda Meir and Devid Remez. But perhaps the most consistent, extremist

Transfer Committee of 1948. Weitz was at the centre of the Zionist land purchasing activities for decades. His intimate knowledge and involvement in land purchase made him sharply aware of its limitations. As late as 1947, after half a century of tireless efforts, the collective ownership of the JNF--which constituted about half of the Yishuv total--amounted to a mere 3.5 percent of the land December 1940:

Amongst ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both peoples in this country. us closer to our aim to be an independent people in this small
country. After the Arabs are transferred, the country will be wide open for us; with the Arabs staying the country will remain narrow and restricted.......There is no room for compromise on this point........land purchasing.......will not bring about the state:.....The only way is to transfer the Arabs from here to neighbouring countries, all of them, except perhaps Bethlehem, Nazareth, and Old Jerusalem. Not a single village or a single tribe must be left. And the transfer must be done through their absorption in Iraq and Syria and even in Transjordan. For that goal, money will be found- even a lot of money. And only then will the country be able to absorb millions of Jews.....there is no other solutions.21

A countryside tour in the summer of 1941 took Weitz to a region in central Palestine. He recorded in his Diary seeing:

large [Arab] villages crowded in population and surrounded by cultivated land growing olives, grapes, figs, sesame, and maize fields.......Would we be able to maintain scattered [Jewish] settlements among these existing [Arab] villages that will always be larger than ours? And is there any possibility of buying their [land]?......and once again I hear that voice inside me called: evacuate this country. [emphasis in the original]22

Earlier in March 1941 Weitz wrote in his Diary after, touring Jewish settlements in the Esdraelon

The complete evacuation of the country from its [Arab] inhabitants and handing it to the Jewish people is the answer.23

In April 1948 Weitz recorded in his Diary:

I made a summary of a list of the Arab villages which in my opinion must be cleared out in order to complete Jewish regions. I also made a summary of the places that have land disputes and must be settled by military means.24

In 1930, against the background of the 1929 disturbances in Palestine, Weizmann, then President of both the World Zionist Organisation and the Jewish Agency Executive, actively began promoting ideas of Arab transfer in private discussions with British officials and ministers. In the same year

member of the Jewish Agency Executive, presented British Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield with an official, albeit secret, proposal for the transfer of Palestinian peasants to Transjordan. This scheme proposed that a loan of one million Palestinian pounds be raised from Jewish financial sources for the resettlement operation. This proposal was rejected by Lord Passfield. However, the justification Weizmann used in its defence formed the cornerstone of subsequent Zionist

precedent for a similar measure for the Palestinians; and that the uprooting and transportation of Palestinians to Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, or any other part of the vast Arab world would merely constitute a relocation from one Arab district to another. Above all, for Weizmann and other leaders of the Jewish Agency, the transfer was a systematic procedure, requiring preparation, money and a great deal of organisation, which needed to be planned by strategic thinkers and technical experts.25

envisaged modalities of, transfer changed over the years according to circumstances. Thus the
lation of Israel Zangwill, soon gave way to more realistic assessments. From the mid-1930s onwards the transfer solution became central to the assessments of the Jewish Agency (practically the government of the Yishuv).

**Three (Semi-Official/Official and Secret) Transfer Committees, 1937-1949:**
Jewish Agency assessments required strategies and planning that produced a series of specific plans, generally involving Transjordan, Syria, or Iraq. Some of these plans were produced by three Transfer Committees: the first two committees, set up by the Yishuv leadership, operated between 1937 and 1944 and the third was officially appointed by the Israeli cabinet in August 1948. As of the late 1930s some of these transfer plans included proposals for agrarian legislation and

In the 1930s and early 1940s Zionist transfer proposals and plans remained largely confined to private and secret talks with British (and occasionally American) senior officials; the Zionist leadership generally refrained from airing the highly sensitive proposals in public. On one occasion, Chaim Weizmann, in a secret meeting with the Soviet ambassador to London, Ivan Meiski, in February 1941, proposed a transfer of one million Palestinians to Iraq in order to settle Polish Jews in their place. More importantly, however, during the Mandatory period, for reasons of political expediency, the Zionists calculated that such proposals could not attract support and even actual British implementation.

The Zionist leadership was tireless in trying to shape the proposals of the Royal (Peel) Commission of 1937. It has generally escaped the attention of historians that the most significant proposal for transfer submitted to the Commission—the one destined to shape the outcome of its findings—was put forward by the Jewish Agency in a 1937 secret memorandum containing a specific paragraph on Arab transfer to Transjordan.

Between 1937 and 1948 very extensive secret discussions concerning Arab transfer were

a) the Zionist Agency Executive;
b) the Twentieth Zionist Congress;

d) various official and non-official discussions politically, morally, and ethically as the natural and logical continuation of Zionist colonisation in Palestine. There was a general endorsement as course would be practicable (in the late 1930s-

**IV) The issues of land and demography:**
Demography and the land issue were at the heart of the Zionist transfer mind-set and secret transfer plans of the 1930s and 1940s. In 1947 the Palestinians were the overwhelming majority in the country and owned much of the land, and the Jewish community was about a third of the total population and owned about 6 percent of the land. In the 1930s and the 1940s the general endorsement of transfer (in different forms: voluntary, agreed, compulsory transfer) had been designed to achieve to two crucial objectives: a) to clear the land for Jewish settlers and would-be immigrants; b) to establish a fairly homogenous Jewish state. Basically Ben-Gurion strongly
believed that Zionism would not succeed to set up a homogenous Jewish state and fulfil its imperative of absorbing the expected influx of Jewish immigrants while allowing the indigenous inhabitants to remain.

V) The 1948 Exodus: Extensively Documented Expulsion Policies in 1948:
On the Question of Premeditation and Action:
First: There is plenty of evidence to suggest that as early as the beginning of 1948 Ben-

Gurion entered the 1948 war with a mind-set and premeditation to expel Palestinians. In early 1948 he wrote in his diary:
During the assault we must be ready to strike a decisive blow; that is, either to destroy the town or expel its inhabitants so our people can replace them.

Second: also on the question of premeditation and action, we should look at Plan Dalet. This Haganah plan of early March 1948 is a straightforward document was, in many ways, a master plan for the expulsion of as many Palestinians as could be expelled. The Plan constituted an ideological-strategic anchor and basis for expulsion by Israeli commanders and the destruction of Arab localities. In conformity with master plan the Haganah cleared various areas completely of Arab

them secretly by mainstream Labour leaders: Ben-Gurion, Weizmann, Shertok, Katznelson (died in 1944), Weitz and Golda Meir (some of whom played a decisive role in the 1948 war) highlights the ideological intent that made the Palestinian refugee exodus in 1948 possible. Ben-Gurion, in particular, emerges from my book and other several books (published in recent years by Israeli

and the great expeller of the Palestinians in 1948. In 1948 there was no need for any cabinet decision to drive the Palestinians out; Prime Minister and Defence Minister Ben-Gurion and his associates, including the key military commanders of the army (Palmah/Haganah/IDF, including Yigal Allon, Moshe Carmel, Yigael Yadin, Moshe Dayan, Moshe Kalman and Yitzhak Rabin), played a key role; everyone, at every level of military and political decision-making understood that the objective is a Jewish state without a large Arab minority.

With the 1948 war, the Zionists succeeded in many of their objectives: above all they created a vastly enlarged Jewish state (on 77 percent of historic Palestine) in which the Palestinians were forcibly reduced to a small and manageable minority. Israeli revisionist/new historians (including Benny Morris, Ilan Pappe, Avi Shlaim, Simha Flapan, Tom Segev, Uri Milstein) as well Nafez Nazzal) have extensively documented the expulsion of the Palestinians in 1948 over the last 15 years. The available evidence show that the evacuation of some three quarters of a million Palestinians in 1948 can only be ascribed to the culmination of Zionist transfer/expulsion policies and not to (mythical) orders issued by the Arab armies. Aharon Cohen, who in 1948 was the Director of the Arab Department of Mapam, wrote a memorandum dated 10 May 1948:
There is reason to believe that what is being done.....is being done out of certain political objectives and not only out of military necessities, as they [Jewish leaders] claim sometimes. from the boundaries of the Jewish state is being implemented......the evacuation/clearing out of Arab villages is not always done out of military necessity. The complete destruction of villages is not always done because there are
Yosef Sprintzak, who in 1948 was Secretary General of the Histadrut, stated at a debate of the Mapai Centre on 24 July 1948, which was held against the background of the Ramle-Lydda expulsions of 12-13 July (see below):

There is a feeling that faits accomplis are being created......The question is not whether the Arabs will return or not return. The question is whether the Arabs are [being or have been] expelled or not.......I want to know, who is creating the facts [of expulsion]? And the facts are being created on orders. 28

he assessed, a total of 282 (85 percent) villages depopulated as a result of direct Jewish attack. However, based on several books published in the last 15 years we have calculated that:

- at least 122 Arab localities were expelled at gun-point by Jewish forces;
- 270 localities were evacuated under the effect military assault by Jewish troops; the tactic of Yigal Allon as a deliberate method to ensure Arab evacuation.
- 38 localities out of fear of Jewish attack or being caught in the fighting;
- 49 localities under the influence of the fall of a neighbouring town;
- 12 as a result of Jewish psychological warfare methods /spreading rumours and using whispering campaigns.

- 13 July 1948: From the territory occupied by the Israelis in 1948-49 about 90 percent of the Palestinians were driven out-many by psychological warfare and/or military pressure. Plus a very large number of Palestinians

widely documented cases of the towns of Lydda and Ramle in July 1948- two very large expulsions which account for nearly 10 percent of the total exodus: the outright expulsion of the town of al-Faluja and remaining inhabitants of the towns of Beisan and of al-Majdal (in 1950); the outright

-Mansura, Tarbikha, Nab Bassa, al-Ghabisiya, Danna, Nuris, al-Tantura, Qisarya, Khirbet al-Sarkas, al-

-Suyyad, al-Bassa, al-Ghabisiya, Danna, Nuris, al-Tantura, Qisarya, Khirbet al-Sarkas, al-

-Qubayba, Yibna, Zakariya,

-Manshiya, al-Dawayma, Dayr Yasin and al-Majdal. In the cases of the towns of Lydda and Ramle in 12-13 July 1948: over 60,000 Palestinians were expelled from the twin towns at gun point (Ben-Gurion and three senior army officers were directly involved: Yigal Allon, Yitzhak Rabin and Moshe Dayan.) During the 1948 war Yigal Allon commanded the operation that conquered the twin towns of Lydda and Ramle. Israeli historian Benny Morris write:

At 13.30 hours on 12 July......Lieutenant-Colonel Yitzhak Rabin, Operation Dani head of

quickly without attention to age. They should be directed to Beit Nabala... Implement

the inhabitants of the neighbouring town of Ramle, occupied by Kiryati troops that morning.....On 12 and 13 July, Yiftah and Kiryati brigades carried out their orders, expelling the 50-60,000 remaining inhabitants of and refugees camped in and around the two towns.....About noon on 13 July, Operation Dani HQ informed IDF General

ed. [The troops] are busy expelling the inhabitants [oskim begeirush hatoshavim
Clogging the roads......the tens of thousands of refugees marched, gradually shedding their worldly goods along the way. It was a hot summer day. Arab chroniclers, such as Sheikh Muhammad Nimr al Khatib, claimed that hundreds of children died in the march, from dehydration and disease. On begin with [jettisoned] utensils and furniture and , in the end, bodies of men, women and children.....

VI) The 1948-49 Massacres: Widespread Atrocities as a Major Factor Precipitating the Exodus

According to Israeli military historian Arieh Yitzhaki (he is also a lecturer at Bar Ilan University), about ten major massacres were committed by Jewish forces in 1948-49—with more than 50 victims in each massacre-and about one hundred smaller massacres (of individuals or small groups). According to Yitzhaki, these massacres (large and small) had a devastating impact on the Palestinian population, by inducting and precipitating the Arab exodus. Yitzhaki went further to suggest that almost in every village there were murders. Israel historian Uri Milstein, a myth- the extent of massacres and goes even further to suggest that each battle in 1948 ended with a massacres were committed but I have no doubt that the war of

Dayr Yasin, 9 April 1948: Dayr Yasin was the site of the most notorious massacre perpetrated against Palestinian civilians in 1948- a massacre which became the single most important contributory factor to the 1948 exodus. On 9 April 1948 over 250 unarmed villagers were murdered, including women, elderly and children. There were also cases of rape and mutilation. Most recent Israeli writers have no difficulty in acknowledging the Dayr Yasin massacre and its effect, if not intention, of precipitating the exodus. However, most of these writers take refuge in the fact that the Dayr Yasin atrocities were committed by the so-called dissidents of the Irgun Tzvai Leumi (Irgun, then commanded by Menahem Begin) and Lehi (Stern Gang, then co-commanded by Yitzhak Shamir), thus exonerating Ben-Zionism. Recently published Hebrew material, however, shows that:
1) in January 1948 that mukhtar village and the notables had reached a non-aggression agreement commander of Jerusalem, David Shaltiel. The latter not only chose to break his agreement with the villagers, but also provided rifles and ammunition for the Irgunists;
3) that the Haganah contributed to the assault on the village with artillery cover from a Palmah company;

assess the effectiveness and performance of the Irgun forces. Although the actual murders of the non-combatants residents were carried out by the Irgun and Lehi, the responsibility for the slaughter of the villagers must be shared by the Haganah and Irgun/Lehi.

More significant, the recently published Israeli material shows that Dayr Yasin was only one among many massacres carried out by Jewish forces in 1948. Indeed the historiography of recent years has documented many large and small massacres carried out mainly by the Haganah and the Israeli army, with the aim of driving Palestinians out. Recent research proves that the Palestinians were less prone to evacuate the towns and villages in the second half of the war. Hence the
numerous massacres committed from June 1948 onwards—such as those of Lydda, Khirbet Nasir al-
Hula—were all geared at forcing mass evacuation;

- **Al-Dawayma, 28-29 October 1948**: In 1948 al-Dawayma was a very large village, with a
  population of some 3,500, situated in the western Hebron hills. Like Dayr Yasin, al-Dawayma was
  unarmed. It was captured on 29 October 1948 without a fight. The massacre of 80-100 villagers
  was carried at the end of October 1948, not in the heat of the battle but after the Israeli army had
  clearly emerged victorious in the war. The testimonies of Israeli soldiers who were at the scene of
  invariably show that the IDF troops entered the village and carried out the liquidation of civilians,
  two old women in a certain house......and blow up the house with them.......One soldier boasted that
  he had raped a women and then shot her. One women, with a new-born baby in her arms, was
  employed to clear the courtyard where the soldiers ate. She worked a day or two. In the end they
  the village, including at the mosque and in the cave nearby, that houses with old people locked
  inside were blown up, and that there were several cases of the shooting and raping of women.34

In *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, Benny Morris, reports the following
(partial) inventory of IDF massacres committed in the Galilee in October 1948, as presented to the
Political Committee of Mapam:

- **Safsaf**- the village of Safsaf in the Safad area was occupied on 29 October 1948. The Jewish
  forces assembled all the inhabitants of the village (who numbered approximately 1,000) and killed
  well and shot. 10 were killed. Women pleaded for mercy. [There were] 3 cases of rape......a girl

- **Jish**-

- **Saliha**-

- **Majd al-Kurum**, November 1948: Seven men and two women were murdered.37

- **Dayr al-Asad and al-** two men from each village were taken and
  executed in public by the IDF soldiers.38

- **Abu-Zurayk**: IDF soldiers executed several Arabs several hours after the capture of the village.

- **Um al-Shuf**: Seven youngsters were murdered after the capture of the village.39
In October 1948, a senior IDF officer, Shmuel Lahis, murdered several dozen Arab civilians (up to 80 people) he was guarding in a mosque in the undefended south Lebanese village of Hula during the land clearing operations of October 1948. He was sentenced to seven years in -general of the Jewish Agency (until 1981) the highest executive position in the World Zionist Organisation.40

Other atrocities carried out earlier in the year were reported by Morris and other researchers:

**Hula, 31 October 1948**
A senior IDF officer, Shmuel Lahis, murdered several dozen Arab civilians (up to 80 people) he was guarding in a mosque in the undefended south Lebanese village of Hula during the land clearing operations of October 1948. He was sentenced to seven years in general of the Jewish Agency (until 1981) the highest executive position in the World Zionist Organisation.40

**Nasr al-Din, 12 April 1948**
Nasir ad Din......some non- In The Palestinian Exodus from Galilee, 1948 attacked the village of Nasr-ed Din (with 90 Arab inhabitants) and destroyed all its houses, killing some o

**al-Tantura, 22-23 May 1948:** In the case of Tantura, the large-scale massacre was well-planned ahead. Tantura and about four coastal villages south of Haifa were targeted by the Israelis for ethnic

Recently Israeli researchers uncovers the Tantura blood-bath, in which scores of Arab civilians were murdered.45

**Lydda, 11-12 July 1948:** On 11-12 dozens of unarmed civilians who were detained in a mosque and church premises of the town were gunned down and murdered. One official Israeli source put the casualty figures at 250 dead and many injured. It is likely, however, that somewhere between 250 and 400 Arabs were killed in the large-scale IDF massacre at Lydda and estimated 350 more died in the subsequent expulsion and forced march of the townspeople.46 On 6 May 1992, Hebrew daily published new revelations about the atrocities committed by the Palmah soldiers at Lydda. After Lydda gave up the fight, a group of stubborn Arab fighters barricaded themselves in the small mosque. After they finished their work, they were shot into the graves they dug.47

**Tel Gezer** (in the south): A soldier of the Israeli Army Kiryati Brigade testified that his colleagues got hold of tens Arab men and two Arab women, a young one and an old one. All the men were murdered. The young women was raped and her destiny unknown. The old woman was murdered.48

**Khisas**, 12 December 1947, 12 Arab villagers were murdered in cold blood in a Haganah raid.
• **Asdud** (in the south), **end August 1948**  
  murdered ten Arab fellahin in cold-blood.49

• **Qisarya (Caesarea), February 1948**: The Fourth Battalion of the Palmah forces, under the command of Yosef Tabenkin, conquered Qisarya. According to historian Uri Milstein, all those who did not escape from the village were murdered.50

• **Kabri, 20 May 1948**: On 20 May the Carmeli Brigade conquered the village of Kabri. One of the Israeli soldiers, Yehuda Rashef, got hold of a few youngsters who did not escape, probably seven, ordered them to fill up some ditches and then lined them up and fired at them with a machine gun. A few died but some of the wounded succeeded to escape.51

• **Abu Shusha**, 14 May 1948: evidence of a large-scale massacre.52

Other atrocities included:

**The King David Hotel** bomb attack (carried out by the Irgun), 22 July 1946; resulted in the death of about 90 British, Arab and Jewish men and women;

**Fajje**, 20 May 1947, several Arab civilians were killed;

, 21 May 1947;

**Abu Laban** family, 15 July 1947;

**Damascus Gate, Jerusalem**, a bomb attack by the Irgun, 13 December 1947, 4 Arab civilians were killed;

**Balad al-Shaykh**, 11 December 1947 and 31 December-1 January 1948; 14 civilians, of whom 10 were women and children were killed the second attack by the Haganah.

**Qazaza**, 19 December 1947; five Arab children were killed in this Haganah attack;

**Jaffa Municipality and Welfare Centre**, 4 January 1947; 17 Arab civilians were killed by attack by Lehi.

**Semiramis Hotel-Jerusalem**, 5 January 1948: The Haganah blew up the hotel; 12 Arab civilians were killed, among them 4 women and 5 children.

9 January 1948, 5 Arab were killed and 5 injured in a Haganah attack.

**Ramle**, 20 February 1948, an attack by the Irgun, killing 6 Arab civilians and wounding 31. Among the killed were 4 children.

**Al-Husayniyya**, 12 March and 16-17 March 1948. The Palmah 3rd Battalion twice attack the village in upper Galilee. In the first attack, 15 Arabs were killed, including 10 women and children, and 20 seriously wounded. In the second raid more than 30 Arab civilians were killed.

**VII) The Wilful and Systematic Depopulation and Destruction of Hundreds of Palestinian Villages:**

solution (which became central to Jewish strategy in the 1930s and 1940s) and the Palestinian **nakba/catastrophe of 1948/ the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem/ the wilful and systematic destruction of hundreds of Arab villages. By the end of the 1948 war, hundreds of villages had been completely depopulated, and their houses blown up or bulldozed-with the main objective of preventing the return of refugees to their homes and villages (in addition to helping perpetuate the Zionist myth/claim entered.) The exhaustive study by a team of Palestinian field researchers and academics under the direction of Professor Walid Khalidi gives details of the destruction of each village, supplying statistical, historical, topographical, archaeological, architectural and economic material, as well as
14 sites, made comprehensive reports, and took photographs, recording all the details that remains. *All That Remains* ⁵³ is both a monumental study and a kind of memorium: an acknowledgement of the enormous suffering of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees (men, women and children.)

There is an apparent inconsistency in the determination of the number of Palestinian localities depopulated and destroyed in 1948. Benny Morris lists 369 villages and towns, and gives the date and circumstances of their depopulation, relying mostly on Israeli archival and non-archival sources. ⁵⁴ is based on the villages or hamlets (only) which are listed in the Palestine Index Gazetteer of 1945 falling inside the 1949 Armistice Lines. ⁴¹⁸ amounts to half the total number of Palestinian villages in Mandated Palestine. More recently Palestinian researcher Salman Abu-Sitta provided an updated register of 531 villages. Abu-register includes the localities listed by Morris and Khalidi, and add those of the tribes in the Beer Sheba District. ⁵⁵ But while Abu-Sitta adds to the list of destroyed villages, most meticulous and comprehensive. Of the 418 depopulated villages, 293 (70 percent) were totally (West of Jerusalem), but were taken by Israeli settlers. While an observant traveller can still see some evidence of these villages, in the main all that remains is a scattering of stones and rubble.

**VIII) The Primary Responsibility of the Zionist Leadership for the Displacement and Dispossession of Three-quarters of Million Palestinian Refugees in 1948:**

discussions/ideological intent and actual expulsion orders in 1948. Mountains of evidence shows carried out. The overwhelming facts show conclusively the primary responsibility of the Zionists for the displacement and dispossession of the Palestinians in 1948. In particular, David Ben-Gurion, the most important founding father of Israel, emerges from several books published in great expeller of the Palestinians in 1948.

Israel was primarily responsible for the Palestinian nakba and creation of the Palestinian refugee problem, which is still at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict; the exodus was largely the deliberate creation of Jewish leaders (mainly Ben-Gurion) and military commanders. It was an outcome of -set, transfer predisposition and premeditation. he 1948 war simply provided an opportunity and the necessary background for the creation of a Jewish state largely free of Arabs; it concentrated Zionist-Jewish mind, and provided the security, military and strategic explanations and justifications for purging the Jewish state and dispossessing the Palestinians.

**The Post-1948 Period:**

three-

Haganah Intelligence Service (Shai) 1936-48 and a Senior Foreign Ministry Advisor on Arab
committee. Apart from doing everything possible to reduce the Palestinian population in Israel, Weitz and his colleagues on the Transfer Committee sought in October 1948 to amplify and consolidate the demographic transformation of Palestine by:

a) preventing the Palestinian refugees from returning to their homes and villages;
b) the destruction of Arab villages;
c) settlement of Jews in Arab villages and towns and the distribution of Arab lands among Jewish settlements;
e) seeking ways which would ensure the absorption of the Palestinian refugees in Arab countries—such as Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Transjordan—and launching a propaganda campaign to discourage Arab return. Apparently Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion approved of these proposals, although he recommended that all the Palestinian refugees be resettled in one Arab state, preferably Iraq, rather than be dispersed among the neighbouring states. Ben-Gurion was also set against refugee resettlement in neighbouring Transjordan.56

In early 1949 Danin was sent by the Foreign Ministry to England to discreetly lobby for 

Throughout the 1950s Israel sought Western partners for its projects of refugee resettlement. From early 1949 onwards Danin, Yosef Weitz and other senior Israeli officials would spend a great deal of efforts on promoting Israeli resettlement schemes. Before his departure to England Danin met must be conducted among the Arabs [refugees] that they demand their resettlement in the Arab 

The main motive for the preoccupation of Danin, Weitz and other colleagues with refugee resettlement projects outside Palestine stemmed from the fear of refugee return. In his letter to the Cabinet Secretary, Zeev Sharef, from London on 6 May 1949, Danin wrote about a letter he

The Palestinian refugee problem has been at the centre of the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1948. It was mainly the refugees themselves who opposed resettlement schemes in Arab countries. In general Palestinians and Arabs refused to discuss a general settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict before Israel declared that it accepted the repatriation of the refugees, in accordance with UN

wish to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so

bi-national state. The official Israeli position has always been that there can be no returning of the refugees to Israeli territories, and that the only solution to the problem was their resettlement in the Arab states or elsewhere. Since 1949 Israel has consistently rejected a return of the 1948 refugees to their homes and villages; it has always refused to accept responsibility for the refugees and views them as the responsibility of the Arab countries in which they reside. The Israelis did not want the refugees back under any condition. They did not want them to return because they needed their lands and their villages for Jewish immigrants. Nor did they want the repatriation of an Arab population that would question the Zionist-Jewish character of the state of Israel and undermine it demographically.
II) Israeli Propaganda/Claims:
Israel has consistently rejected a return of the 1948 refugees to their homes and villages; it has always refused to accept responsibility for the refugees and views them as the responsibility of the Arab countries in which they reside. Since 1948 all Israeli governments have even refused to discuss any possible return of refugees to the pre-1967 borders. They did not want the refugees back under any condition. They did not want them to return because they needed their lands and their villages for Jewish immigrants. Nor did they want the repatriation of an Arab population that would question the Zionist-Jewish character of the state of Israel and undermine it demographically. Israel did, however, consider (between 1949 and 1953) some form of restitution of refugee property in lieu of repatriation. (See below).

Since 1948 Israel has continued to claim that the Palestinian refugee exodus was a tactic of war on the part of the Arabs who initiated the war against the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine. In fact report of October 1948, formulated the main line and arguments of Israeli propaganda in the following decades. It denied any Israeli culpability or responsibility for the Arab exodus- denied, in return of the refugees and proposed that the government play a major role in promoting refugee resettlement in the Arab host countries.

Israel has also argued that the Palestinian refugees constituted a population exchange with was misleading, Israeli spokesmen continued to propagate it at home and abroad and many of The New Middle East,

Palestinians fled from their villages and towns in 1948 under orders from their leaders (an allegation that many researchers, including Walid Khalidi, Erskine Childers, Benny Morris, Tom Segev, Simha Flapan, Ilan Pappe, and Nur Masalha have proved untrue); b) Peres underestimates the number of the 1948 refugees (at 600,000) and equates them with the number of Jews who left Arab countries for Israel; c) The time has come, Peres argues, to turn away from history and

Another recent statement of the Israeli position on the issue was voiced by Yossi Beilin (then Deputy Foreign Minister and currently Justice Minister), after the fourth meeting of the leaders of the 1948 refugees know fully well that these refugees will not be able to return to 66 Major General (Reserve) Shlomo Gazit-- a former Coordinator of Israeli Activities in the West Bank and Gaza, and a former Director of Military Intelligence-- who has close links with the Israeli establishment-- recently argued that the return of Palestinian refugees would bring about a substantial increase in the Arab community in Israel, effectively creating a Trojan horse, an irredentist enemy within:

Palestinian immigration into Israel, the result could be a very significant increase of Palestinian Arabs that would threaten the Jewish character of the state. Israel is already concerned with a possible irredentist threat from its present Arab minority.
adjacent to Arab territory across the border— the Galilee and the Negev— their relative strength is significantly higher (in the Galilee they already number at least 67 borders.67

In the 1950s

cannot solve it-- dissolve it 68 meaning if you cannot solve the Palestinian refugee problem, as a economic means and employment projects. In other words, the problem of the Palestine refugees could and should be solved by an economic approach, mainly through their integration into the economies and societies of their actual countries of residence and/or through their dispersal
determination to remove the problem from the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

III) Expulsion of the Inhabitants of the Town of al-Majdal to Gaza, Summer 1950:

Moshe Dayan was not alone in supporting the expulsion of Israel's Arab minority. According to Benny Morris, "During the immediate post-1948 period, talk of 'transferring' Israel's Arab minority was relatively common in Israel."69 Army Chief of Staff, Yigael Yadin, supported implicitly the "transfer" of Israel's Arabs. In consultation with Ben-Gurion on 8 February 1950, he described the Israeli Arabs as "a danger in time of war, as in time of peace."70 The head of the military government, Lieutenant Colonel 'Emmanuel Mor (Markovsky), stated in 1950 ("with probably only marginal exaggeration," according to Benny Morris), that "the entire nation [i.e., Jews] in Zion [i.e., Israel], without exception, does not want Arab neighbours."71 About the same time, in the summer of 1950, almost two years after the 1948 war, the remaining 2,700 inhabitants of the southern Arab town al-Majdal (now called Ashkelon) received expulsion orders and were transported to the border of the Gaza Strip over a period of a few weeks. The town, which on the eve of the war had 10,000 inhabitants, had been conquered by the Israeli army on 4 November 1948. From that time and throughout 1949, the Commanding Officer of the Southern Command, General Yigal Allon, had "demanded... that the town be emptied of its Arabs."72 A government "Committee for Transferring Arabs" had decided in February 1949 in principle to remove the remaining 2,700 inhabitants of al-Majdal. A year later, in the spring of 1950, General Moshe Dayan, Allon's successor in the Southern Command, had decided to direct the clearing of al-Majdal's residents to Gaza. Authorization for this action was given by Ben-Gurion on 19 June 1950.73 A day earlier, on 18 June, Dayan had appeared before the Mapai Secretariat and stated that he supported the total transfer of all the Israeli Arabs out of the country.74

Some 700,000 Jews arrived in Israel between its proclamation as an independent state in May 1948 and the end of 1951. The state's leaders believed that al-Majdal and its lands were needed for rehousing and settling these new immigrants. Na'im Gila'adi, a newly arrived Iraqi Jew, was put together with other Iraqi immigrants in a ma'abarah, a transit camp, near al-Majdal. According to Gila'adi, several important figures in the Jewish Agency came to reassure them: "Be patient: soon we shall drive the Arabs out of Majdal and you will be able to have their houses." Gila'adi recalled many years later:

For us this was a shock. Majdal was a nearby little town, and we knew nothing of its inhabitants. One night, five or six of us crossed the barbed wire that surrounded Majdal to go and speak to the inhabitants, to see who they were, and why they wanted to drive them out. Talking to them, we discovered that they were very
peaceful people, very hospitably disposed towards us, and ready to behave as loyal citizens of the state that has just been founded. And it was those people they wanted to drive out to settle us in their houses.75

The Israeli State Archives in Jerusalem contain tens of official files with extensive information pertaining to Israel's policies toward the Arab minority, including what usually is described in Israel as "population transfers." Although a substantial part of these files are open to researchers and have been used for this book, many official files remain classified. However, some idea about the contents of these closed files may be gathered from the Archives' index listing those files of the Ministry of Minorities: Expulsion of Inhabitants; Transfer of Inhabitants; Concentration of Arab Residents; Complaints about Police Treatment; Demolition of Arab Houses; and Acts against Civilians.

IV) Compensations: Israeli Proposals, 1949-53:

I through the integration of the refugees into the economies of various Arab countries and through the initiation of various organised resettlement schemes, also went hand in hand with the Israeli approach to the issue of restitution of refugee property. Already in October 1948 the official Transfe immovable goods [that is, lands, houses abandoned] in the country (after reparations [for war damages to the Yishuv] are deducted), the Arab states will give land, the rest [will come-] from. 76 The committee had also attempted to work out the financial value of abandoned Arab property, but was unable to reach any conclusions without further study.77

A year la reconstituted as the Compensation Committee with the addition of a number of technical advisors and submitted its recommendations six months later. It recommended that in the context of an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict Israel should make a single, global payment of compensation for rural refugee property, for undamaged urban property, and for bank accounts. At the same time the Compensation Committee advised against the payment of compensation for the Arab share of state land and against making individual restitution payments for individual refugees for two main reasons (according to the committee): first, this would take years to arbitrate, and second, perhaps more importantly, this would require that refugee owners of property be allowed to return to Israel to take part in the evaluation of their assets. This prospect was considered completely undesirable.78 Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, in particular, ruled out the idea of personally compensating each refugee, Israel would not enter into individual claims of compensation.79

In 1953 the Israeli government made another attempt to work out a policy on restitution of refugee property by appointing in June a new committee that also included senior government

Israel should contribute $100 million, on account of the overall restitution bill, to an international fund which would be created in order to initiate collective resettlement projects in Arab countries. This willingness to contribute a share towards the financial cost of compensation was encouraged by the anticipated increase in foreign currency liquidity as a result of the Reparations Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, signed earlier in September 1952.80 About the same time various Israeli estimates of the global value of total movable and immovable Palestinian refugee property were close to $350 million.81 Although this figure was close to the United Nations Refugee Office
losses arrived at in two detailed Palestinian studies.\textsuperscript{82}

During the early 1950s the Israeli government signalled its willingness to contribute to any international fund established to resettle Palestinian refugees in Arab countries or elsewhere collectively. However, at the same time, Israel was prepared to shoulder only a share of the total financial costs of resettling the refugees. Moreover gradually all Israeli attempts to work out proposals on restitution of Palestinian refugee property were tied to a settlement of abandoned Jewish property in Iraq, and later in other Arab countries.\textsuperscript{83} Consequently, since the mid-1950s all Israeli governments have, in effect, refused to admit any responsibility for monetary compensation to the Palestinian refugees.\textsuperscript{84}

1949-1956:
The Palestinian refugees themselves and their leaders have traditionally demanded repatriation and was enshrined in UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III). The refugees believed they eventually would return to their homes and villages in what became Israel. Moreover, large numbers of Lebanon, i
Between 1948 and 1956, tens of thousands of refugees--mainly peasants deeply attached to their lands--villages either to slip home, or to see relatives, or to collect possessions, or pick up unharvested crops or, in some cases, to raid Israeli border settlements. Occasionally some of these acutely

The first Israeli objective was to prevent the return of refugees to their homes and villages and foil the danger of refugees resettling themselves quietly inside Israel.\textsuperscript{86} To combat this persistent targets in general and refugee camps in the Gaza Strip in particular. These attacks resulted in many civilian deaths.

Furthermore, \textsuperscript{87} One major reason for the insistence with which Israel prosecuted its

was the desire of the Zionist ruling establishment to exercise permanent pressure on the Arab states to remove the Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war from the proximity of the armistice lines and to disperse them throughout the interior of the Arab world.\textsuperscript{88}

Also thousands of refugees who had managed to slip back into their villages were rounded up by the Israeli army and expelled across the border in the early years of the state.

VI) Wholesale Land Expropriation:
The outcome of the 1948 war left Israel in control of over five million acres of Palestinian land. After 1948, the Israeli state took over the land of the 750,000 Palestinian refugees, who were barred from returning, while the remaining Palestinian minority was subjected to laws and regulations that effectively deprived it of most of its land. The entire massive drive to take over Palestinian land has
been conducted according to strict legality. Since 1948 Israel has enacted some 30 statutes that transferred land from private Arab to state (Jewish) ownership.\textsuperscript{89}

\textbf{-1960s}

In 1948, the Zionist concept of transfer had not been applied universally, and the Israeli army's expulsion policy failed to rid the new Jewish state of a small Arab minority that remained in situ. However, having expelled 750,000 Palestinian Arabs from the greatly enlarged boundaries of the state and having reduced the Arab population from a large majority to a small minority, the pragmatic Labour leadership believed that it largely, although not entirely, had solved its land/settlement and political/"demographic" problems, and was prepared reluctantly to tolerate the presence of a small, politically subordinate and economically dependent Arab minority--some 150,000 Palestinians of the over 900,000 who used to reside in the areas that became the state of Israel in the aftermath of the 1948 war.

In search of international recognition for the newly-proclaimed state, the Israeli Provisional State Council, the forerunner of the Knesset, included in the Independence Charter a promise that the Jewish state would "uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens, without distinction of religion, race, and sex." What, in fact, took place was exactly the opposite. After its establishment, Israel treated the Palestinians still remaining within its frontiers almost as foreigners. It swiftly imposed a military government in the areas inhabited by the Arab minority, expropriated over half of the lands of this "non-Jewish" population, and pursued various policies of demographic containment, political control, exclusionary domination, and systematic discrimination in all spheres of life. The military government was imposed by Prime Minister and Defense Minister David Ben-Gurion, and it became associated closely both with his hostile attitude toward the Arab minority and his authoritarian style and almost unchallenged leadership of the ruling Labour Party. The daily \textit{Haaretz} reported in 1958 that Ben-Gurion had refused the identity card issued to him because it was printed in Arabic as well as Hebrew.\textsuperscript{90} Ben-Gurion's views about the Arab citizens echoed deep-seated sentiments within the Labour establishment, sentiments that found their most crude embodiment in the establishment of military rule in the Arab areas. Generally speaking, the supporters of Ben-Gurion's militarist approach deemed that the "security" aspect must take precedence over any other considerations in dealing with the Arab minority.

The institution of the military government, together with the imposition of the \textit{Defence (Emergency) Regulations} promulgated by the British Mandatory authorities in 1945, empowered the military governors to close off the Arab localities and to restrict entry or exit only to those who had been issued permits by the military authorities. These regulations also enabled the Israeli authorities to evict and deport people from their villages and towns; to place individuals under administrative detention for indefinite periods without trial; and to impose fines and penalties without due process. The military governors also were authorised to close Arab areas in order to prevent internal Arab refugees (also referred to as "present absentees," they were estimated at 30,000, or one-fifth of those remaining) from returning to their homes and lands that had been confiscated by the state and taken over by new and old Jewish settlements.

Officially the purpose of imposing martial law and military government on Israel's Arab minority was security. However, its establishment, which lasted until 1966, was intended to serve a number of both stated and concealed objectives:
The first objective was to prevent the return of the Palestinian refugees, or "infiltrators" in Israeli terminology, to their homes. "In the process other Arabs who had not infiltrated the country were sometimes driven out as well."91

A second goal was:

to evacuate semi-abandoned [Arab] neighborhoods and villages as well as some which had not been abandoned--and to transfer their inhabitants to other parts of the country. Some were evacuated from a "security cordon" along the borders, and others were removed in order to make room for Jews.92

The third purpose of the military government was to maintain control and supervision over the Israeli Arabs, who were separated and isolated from the Jewish population.93

On 24 March 1949, Ben-Gurion appointed a committee that was directed to submit to him recommendations on whether the military government should be abolished, or, alternatively, whether any changes in its policies toward the Arab minority ought to be carried out. By determining the composition of the committee, Ben-Gurion seemed to have ensured the outcome of its investigations. The committee was headed by General Elimelech Avner, who was the head of the military government, and its two other members were Major Michael Hanegbi, the military governor of the Negev, and Yehoshua's Palmon of the Foreign Ministry. In its report, submitted to the Prime Minister on 3 May 1949, the committee stressed that the continuation of a forceful military government was essential for security, demographic, and land settlement reasons. The committee maintained, *inter alia*, that, a comprehensive and effective supervision over the Arab population was needed in order to:

a) prevent it from becoming a fifth column;
b) prevent "infiltration" of Palestinian refugees back to their homes and villages;
c) find "a solution to the problem of the Arab refugees who are present within the boundaries of the state [because the problem of internal refugees] requires the transfer [of Arab communities] from one place to another, the concentration of land for their resettlement, the transfer of [Arab] workers to employment centres, [and] directed [Jewish] settlement policies....The implementation of all these requires a regime with military character, which is not subject to the rules of normal procedures";
d) "would [facilitate] greatly the implementation of the desired demographic and land policies, and the process of populating [with Jews] the abandoned Arab villages and towns."94

The use of force and coercion formed an important element in Israel's policy toward its Arab citizens in the post-1948 period. The institution of the military government, together with the imposition of the Defense Emergency Regulations promulgated by the British Mandatory authorities in 1945, empowered the military governors to close off the Arab localities and to restrict entry or exit only to those who had been issued permits by the military authorities. These regulations also enabled the Israeli authorities to evict and deport people from their villages and towns: to place individuals under administrative detention for indefinite periods without trial; and to impose fines and penalties without due process.95 The military governors also were authorized to close Arab areas in order to prevent internal Arab refugees (also referred to as "present absentee," they were estimated at 30,000, or one-fifth of those remaining) from returning to their homes and lands that had been confiscated by the state and taken over by new and old Jewish settlements.96 Yehoshua's Palmon of the Foreign Ministry suggested in a letter to the Custodian of the Absentees' Property, Zalman Lifschitz of the Prime Minister's Office, and the attorney general that "in the cases in which [internal] refugees want to sell their property in their former place of residence and leave the country, we should encourage them to do that."97 Copies of the letter were sent to the foreign
minister, the military government, and Yosef Weitz. A year later, Palmon, then advisor on Arab affairs in the Prime Minister's Office, wrote a letter to Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett in which he expounded his views on the prickly issue of the property of the "present absentees":

Arab residents of Israel, who, from a social, religious, or cultural viewpoint, are not inclined to remain in Israel, after they would receive all or a respectable part of the compensation for their property, and their hope for what they had not received [their actual property] was lost, they would look for and find a way to leave the country. 98

The Israeli State Archives in Jerusalem contain tens of official files with extensive information pertaining to Israel's policies toward the Arab minority, including what usually is described in Israel as "population transfers." Although a substantial part of these files are open to researchers and have been used for this book, many official files remain classified. However, some idea about the contents of these closed files may be gathered from the Archives' index listing those files of the Ministry of Minorities: Expulsion of Inhabitants; Transfer of Inhabitants; Concentration of Arab Residents; Complaints about Police Treatment; Demolition of Arab Houses; and Acts against Civilians. 99

A combination of military-strategic, demographic-settlement, and Zionist ideological considerations governed Israeli transfer activities in the post-1948 period. Some expulsions continued to be carried out throughout the 1950s, mostly in the early and mid-1950s.

In October 1952, Ben-Gurion asked then Minister-without-portfolio Pinhas Lavon (later Defense Minister) to look into the functioning of the military government. Lavon's report, which was presented a few weeks later, criticized the military government as inefficient and harboring much corruption. Lavon also attempted to deal with claims he heard from army General Staff representatives, who had asserted that the reason for the difficulties and inefficiency of the military government was the lack of a consistent policy toward the Arab minority. This inconsistency, according to the army, was the result of the activities of civilian ministries among the Arab population, in parallel with army activities. The army, Lavon wrote, wanted an exclusive and total authority in dealing with the Arab minority. However, he recommended not to accept the army's demand although he opposed abolition of the military government and the Defense Emergency Regulations promulgated by the British Mandatory authorities in 1945. Lavon's report was most telling:

The claim about the "lack of a consistent policy" [made by representatives of the General Staff] is based on the demand to [adopt] a policy which would lead to the emigration of the Arab residents from the territory of the State of Israel...Such emigration is undoubtedly desirable, but it is doubtful whether it would be possible to achieve that--the emigration of tens of thousands of Arabs--with the means available to a military government in time of peace, in a democratic state, which is open to criticism, supervision, and is in need of world's sympathy. The harm [resulting] from half measures is clear, and their benefit is doubtful. Absolutely effective means [which would bring about the total departure of the Arab minority] cannot be pursued by the state of Israel, without the shaking of its international position.

While describing the idea of a wholesale mass exodus of the Arab minority as "desirable" but not practicable for international as well as domestic reasons, Lavon, like most Israeli ministers and senior officials, was still in favour of an active policy of encouraging "voluntary" transfer:

The above explanation does not come [however] to weaken or belittle the efforts being made in order to obtain the consent of Arab residents [Israeli citizens] to
emigrate to foreign countries. Such plans deserve encouragement and full support from the [official] institutions concerned. The required financial investment is certainly worthwhile, and it is desirable that the treasury [Finance Ministry] ought actively to enter into details [of these plans].

Demography, land, and water were always at the heart of the conflict between the Zionist immigrants/settlers and the native Palestinians. The quest for land and demography also underpinned the Zionist concept of transfer in the pre-1948 period. In a sense, Zionism's long lasting battle against the native Palestinians was a battle for "more land and less Arabs." This battle essentially was dictated by Zionism's premises and fundamentals: the "ingathering" of the world's Jews in Palestine, the acquisition and conquest of land ("kibbush haadamah"), and the establishment of a state for the Jews—who mostly had yet to arrive in Palestine—at the expense of the displaced and "transferred" Palestinians. The creation of Israel did not alter Zionism's premises and fundamentals with regard to the Palestinian minority remaining under Israeli control. Indeed, the principal objectives of the Israeli state, as defined in terms of its Zionist ideology, is the fulfillment of the Jewish majority's aspirations, and those of would-be Jewish immigrants, frequently at the expense of the aspirations of the Palestinian minority.

Although most Labour leaders did not view the existence of a small, politically controlled and economically dependent, Arab minority in the Jewish state as seriously endangering the Zionist programme, the most influential leaders, including Ben-Gurion and Sharett supported in the 1950s various proposals and schemes aimed at further reducing that Arab minority. For example, "Operation Yohanan" was an attempt to transfer Arab citizens to Brazil and Argentina, while the "Libyan Operation" envisioned their resettlement in Libya. The available evidence shows that during the early years of the state, the Arab question in Israel was considered temporary. In fact, many Israeli Jews expected the Arab minority to disappear so that they would not have to establish permanent relations with it.

In his book 1949: The First Israelis, Israeli historian Tom Segev shows that the Israeli leadership worried about the presence of an Arab minority who already had been allowed to vote and be elected to the Knesset. "There are too many Arabs in the country," declared Yitzhak Ben-Tzvi (president of Israel from 1952 to 1963) at a meeting of the Labour Secretariat on 8 January 1949. Ben-Tzvi, a close associate of Ben-Gurion and one of Labour's most influential and popular leaders, voiced the sentiments of many leaders of the ruling party. Several months later, at another meeting of the Labour Secretariat, Knesset member Shlomo Lavi said:

The large number of Arabs in the country worries me. The time may come when we will be the minority in the State of Israel. There are now 170,000 Arabs in the country, including 22,000 school-age children. The natural increase among Arabs is high and keeps growing, especially if we give them all the economic advantages which we are intending to give: health, education and big profits. There is no such rate of natural increase anywhere in the world, and we have to give careful thought to this imminent danger. Such an increase could match our immigration....We may reach the point when the interests of the Arabs rather than of the Jews will determine the character of the country....

Another Labour MK, Eliahu Hacarmeli, who, since the mid-1930s had supported the concept of total transfer, insisted on a total transfer of Israel's Arab minority at the same meeting:
I'm not willing to accept a single Arab, and not only an Arab but any gentile. I want the State of Israel to be entirely Jewish, the descendants of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob....

Similar thoughts were expressed by MK Yehiel Duvdevany, of Kibbutz Giv'at Hashloshah: "If there was any way of solving the problem by way of a transfer of the remaining 170,000 Arabs we would do so...” Zeev Onn, the Labour Secretary and a prominent leader of the Histadrut added: "The landscape is also more beautiful—I enjoy it, especially when traveling between Haifa and Tel Aviv, and there is not a single Arab to be seen.” Equally revealing is the reaction of Ben-Gurion while touring the Galilee in the 1950s. Seeing many Arab villages in the distance, he became angry and declared: "Whoever tours the Galilee gets the feeling that it is not part of Israel.”

After 1948, Israeli use of force continued in an attempt to induce some of the remaining Arabs to leave the country. Wholesale expulsions of Arabs, many with Israeli citizenship, across the border continued well into the late 1950s. In fact, as late as 1959—eleven years after the establishment of the state—Bedouin tribes were expelled from the Negev to the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt and to Jordan; only after United Nations intervention was this 1959 action reversed. Over ten thousand Israeli Arabs were expelled by the Israeli army across the border in the early years of the state (together with many other thousands of Palestinian refugees who had managed to "infiltrate" back to their villages and towns).

The several instances of collective expulsion of Israeli Arab residents in the post-1948 period need to be reviewed. For instance, on 31 May 1950 the Israeli army transported about 120 Palestinians in two crowded trucks to a point near the edge of Wadi Araba, a hot desert wasteland astride the Israeli-Jordanian frontier between the Dead Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba. The Palestinians were ordered to cross to Jordan, with the soldiers "firing bursts over their heads to urge them forward." While most of the expellees made it, as many as thirty-six "may be assumed...[to have] perished from thirst and starvation," the British Minister to Amman, Kirkbride, wrote. The survivors, who were questioned in Jordan, were found to be:

- Members of divided families who infiltrated across the line to find their relatives, or who fled from what is now Israeli territory when the Jews arrived there, abandoning money and valuables in their homes;
- Refugees caught en route from Gaza to Jordan; and
- Arabs living in their homes in Israel, with whom the Jews have become displeased for some reason or other.

This incident shows that in the process of expelling Palestinian refugees who had managed to "infiltrate" back into their villages and towns some Israeli Arabs also were driven out. In the wake of this incident, which triggered an internal debate within the ruling Mapai party about the policy of expelling "infiltrators" (returning refugees), Foreign Minister Sharett, while supporting the general policy of expelling "infiltrators," also expressed his attitude toward Israel's Arab minority at a meeting of the Mapai Knesset faction and party secretariat on 18 June 1950:

If there is a possibility of reducing the Arab minority, if there is a possibility of prompting some [Arab] village or community, a certain number of Arabs, to leave the country, to send them on their way by peaceful means—this must be done....If there is a possibility today of reducing the Arab minority, which numbers some 170,000, by one thousand—it should be done, but it depends on how one does it....One must not strive to do this by a wholesale policy of repression and discrimination. First of all, by such [means] the objective will be missed....I say that we must adopt a dual policy, we must stand firm as a wall against infiltration and not to be deterred from
using harsh measures, but at the same time we must understand that the Arabs who
remain in Israel...must be assured a minimum.

At the same meeting, Moshe Dayan, the Commanding Officer of the Southern Command,
expressed his extremist views on Israel's Arabs, whom he regarded as a fifth column:
I hope that there will perhaps be another opportunity in the future to transfer these
Arabs from the Land of Israel, and as long as such a possibility exists, we must do
nothing to foreclose the option....It is possible that the moment a way of resettling the
700,000 [Palestinian] refugees is found, the same method will also prove good for
the resettlement [outside Israel] of these Arabs [i.e., the Israeli Arab minority]. It is
possible that when there is an Arab state...which, with world agreement, is ready to
resettle Arabs in other places, then that same agreement will be [extended] to the
transfer of this [i.e., Israeli Arab] population as well.

Expulsion activities also were carried out in the Little Triangle after its annexation to Israel
in May 1949, following the Rhodes agreement signed with Jordan on 3 April 1949. For instance, in
late May or early June 1949, 4,000 "internal refugees" were expelled by the military government
from the Little Triangle across the border into the West Bank. The military governor of the central
area, Lieutenant Colonel `Emmanuel Markovsky, reported to the head of the military government,
General Elimelech Avner, on 30 June 1949:

Upon our entry into the area [the Little Triangle] and the proclamation of [Israel's]
rule in it, we announced that we will not recognize the [internal] refugees as being
entitled to reside in the area or any aid and benefit. We prohibited their employment
in any work... we banned organizing permanent aid for them. When we received
authorization to transfer them across the border, the action was implemented in full
within a week.

Markovsky also added that after the military government put pressure on "representatives" of the
Little Triangle's villages (possibly certain mukhtars), the latter had agreed to assist in the process. In
conclusion, Markovsky wrote: "In retrospect, this action proved that a fair and forceful rule in the
[Israeli Arab] villages gives the possibility of implementing tasks in full, and fortifies Israel's rule."

In the same year (1949), some 1,000 people from the village of Baqa al-Gharbiyya in the
Little Triangle were expelled by Israel across the border into the West Bank. In early February
1951, the residents of thirteen small Arab villages in Wadi `Ara were expelled over the border.
Later, on 17 November of the same year the inhabitants of the village of Khirbat al-Buwayshat in
the Little Triangle also were expelled and their houses were dynamited by the army. Zalman
Lifschitz, adviser on land affairs in the Prime Minister's Office--who also had been a member of the
1948 (Israeli government) "Transfer Committee"--reported to the Prime Minister, the Foreign
Minister, and the Finance Minister on 3 July 1950 that it would be possible to persuade the 1,760
residents of the village of Kafr Qare'a near Wadi `Ara to cross to the West Bank on condition that
they would be compensated for their property left behind. Lifschitz strongly recommended that the
government should bear the financial cost of these transfer activities and pay the would-be evacuees
10 Israeli lira for each dunum left behind:

Such activities were carried out in the past and being undertaken and carried out in
the [Little] Triangle also now...It seems to me that we have a great interest in
encouraging the process of departure [of Israeli Arabs] and in reducing the Muslim
Arab minority, on the one hand, and in solving the problem of land itself, on the
other.
Earlier in 1949 some 700 people from Kafr Yassif village in the Galilee were trucked to the Jordanian border and ordered to cross it. These villagers never had left the Galilee during the war, but simply had fled their homes in adjoining villages and moved to Kafr Yassif. In a Knesset debate on 8 March 1949, Communist Knesset Member Tawfiq Tubi strongly protested against this large single expulsion. He stated:
The forced evacuation of Arab villages has also been carried out by the Israeli authorities. Only a few weeks ago 700 people who had taken refuge in the village of [Kafr] Yasif [sic] during the [1948] war were taken to the Iraqi front [on the northern West Bank border with Israel] in trucks and forced to cross the lines to Abdullah....

In mid-April 1949, the U.S. consul in Jerusalem reported that "several hundred" Galilee Arabs--"all Israeli citizens"--had been expelled by the Israeli army across the border, together with some Palestinian refugees who had "infiltrated" back to their villages. Such expulsions often were carried out with brutality, as one Kibbutz woman wrote anonymously to the newspaper `Al-Hamishmar of witnessing such "infiltrators," men, women and children blindfolded, being trucked out:

Those of us standing nearby had witnessed no bad behaviour on the part of the Arabs, who sat frightened, almost one on top of the other. But the soldiers were quick to teach us what they meant by "order." "The expert" jumped up and began to...hit [the Arabs] across their blindfolded eyes and when he had finished, he stamped on all of them and then, in the end, laughed uproariously and with satisfaction at his heroism. We were shocked by this despicable act. I ask, does this not remind us exactly of the Nazi acts towards the Jews?

To some extent the actual transfer activities described above were an extension of Israel's expulsion policy of 1948 into the late 1950s. Only this time the victims were Israeli Arabs, many with Israeli residency papers. However, the main focus of Israel's policies toward the remaining Palestinian minority gradually shifted from mass expulsion to demographic containment, political control, exclusionary domination, and a whole constellation of government policies--military rule, blatant discrimination, land confiscation. The last wholesale expulsion of Israeli Arabs was in 1959, eleven years after the establishment of the state.

II) Two Widely P
November 1948-2000

Arab citizens in the post-1948 period. One of the first incidents of eviction of Israeli Arabs from their villages was the forced evacuation of the villages of Iqrit and Bir'im on 6 November 1948. In his book, *Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956*, Israeli historian Benny Morris discusses the issue of "Expelling Border Communities [Israeli Arabs] and Nudging Back the Borders":

At the end of 1948....Israel decided to clear its border areas of [Israeli] Arab villages, to a depth of five or ten kilometres. The motive of the policy-- initially implemented at the beginning of November along the Lebanese border--was military: Arab villages along the border, just behind IDF positions and patrol roads, constituted a threat. They could receive and assist Arab troops and irregulars should the Arabs renew the war; harbour saboteurs and spies; and serve as way stations for infiltrating [Palestinian refugees] returnees, thieves, and smugglers. Partly depopulated villages, such as Tarshiha in the Galilee, beckoned infiltrators [returning refugees] bent on resettlement. And some semi-abandoned border villages, such as Zakariya, in the Jerusalem Corridor, were a socio-economic burden on the state since the young adult males were mostly dead, incarcerated, or had fled to Jordan, while the old, the
women, and the children of the village lived off government handouts. Lastly, the authorities wanted as small an Arab minority as possible in the new Jewish state. In part, these border-area transfers were designed to hamper infiltration [of Palestinian refugees] into Israel.  

homes and villages has stretched out to more than half a century. In December 1995 (under the pragmatic coalition of Labour-Meretz) a ministerial committee recommended that about 600 families be allowed back and that each village receive 60 hectares of land. Eligibility to return would be restricted to heads of household who lived in one of the villages and owned a house there on 6 November 1948, as well as two adult descendants per household (with their dependents). These recommendations were never implemented.

A committee of directors-general formed in early 1996-in response to the ongoing land (having lost more land through expropriation after 1948) and insisted that all their descendants be allowed back, while Jewish settlements in the area urged that less land be handed back to the Arab villagers. A committee of directors-general formed in early 1996-in response to the ongoing - amended the recommendations of December 1995 by removing the two descendants restriction; it also suggested that the government consider expansion of the two No action was taken. A petition filed by the Iqrit villagers in late 1996 was still pending in 1999 before the High Court of Justice: the villagers wanted to Court to order that the ministerial committee recommendations be implemented. On 2 December 1998, the the villagers to return. However

precedent to allow other internal refugees (some 250,000) to return to the villages and homes.

III) Expulsion of the Negev Bedouin, 1949-1959:
The Negev was an early focus of expulsion activities. According to the 1947 UN Partition Plan, the Negev had been included in the areas allotted to the Palestinian Arab state. After its occupation, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion in particular had been anxious to populate the Negev with Jews.

In November 1949, some 500 Arab Bedouin families (2,000 people) from the Beer Sheba area were forced across the border into the West Bank. Jordan complained about this expulsion. A further expulsion of 700-1,000 persons of the `Azazme or Djahalin tribes to Jordan took place in May 1950. On 2 September 1950 the Israeli Army rounded up hundreds of `Azazme tribesmen (a United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation-UNTSO-complaint spoke of 4,000) from the Negev "and drove them...into Egyptian territory." A week later further expulsion of the `Azazme tribesmen was carried out. UNTSO chief of staff Major-General William Riley put the total number of Bedouin at Qusayma in Sinai in mid-September 1950 at 6,200, the majority having been recently expelled by the Israeli army from the Negev. Riley also wrote that the Israeli army killed 13 Bedouin during these expulsion operations. (The Israelis claimed that the `Azazme tribesmen were crossing back and forth continually between the Negev and Sinai.) In September 1952 the Israeli army expelled some 850 members of the Al-Sani tribe from the northern Negev to the West Bank. "Subsequently," Morris writes, "several thousand more `Azazme and other bedouin tribesmen were expelled to Sinai." Morris quotes an Israel Foreign Ministry report as stating during 1949-53 "Israel expelled all told `close' to 17,000 Negev bedouin, not all of them alleged infiltrators." The Arabs of the Negev had been reduced through expulsion and flight from 65,000-95,000, at the end of the British Mandate, to 13,000 by 1951. In fact, the remaining Arabs of the Negev were not granted Israeli
identity cards until 1952, a situation which made it easier for the Israeli army to push them out. A year later, in 1953, it was reported in the United Nations that 7,000 Arab Bedouin, approximately half of them from the ‘Azazme tribe, had been forcibly expelled from the Negev. In March 1955, members of the ‘Azazme tribe, including women and children, suffered a massacre at the hands of the notorious "Unit 101" of the Israeli army, which had been created by Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan in 1953. Commanded by Ariel Sharon and patronised in particular by Ben-Gurion, Unit 101 was considered the "bayonet" of the army and carried out numerous raids against Arab targets across the border. The tactics used by the unit were debated widely in Israel. Its expulsive action against Bedouin tribes of the Negev in the mid-1950s was described in the daily Haaretz in November 1959:

The army's desert patrols would turn up in the midst of a Bedouin encampment day after day dispersing it with a sudden burst of machine-gun fire until the sons of the desert were broken and, gathering what little was left of their belongings, led their camels in long silent strings into the heart of the Sinai desert.

A shaykh of a Negev tribe, Tarabin al-Sani’, recalled in a conversation with a journalist in 1985: Those were the days of military government and do you know what that means? It meant that they could kill people as if they were stray dogs out there in the desert with no witness to record their atrocities.

V) The Massacre of Kafr Qassim, 29 October 1956:

The plan was aborted after Israeli soldiers massacred 49 Palestinian civilians in the village of Kafr Qassim. On 25 October 1991, 35 years after this infamous massacre, the Hebrew newspaper Hadashot revealed for the first time an expulsion plan that stood behind the massacre. The essence of which was to expel 100,000 Israeli Arab citizens, apparently to Jordan. In an investigative report by Rubik Rosenthal, who had interviewed several officers connected to the episode and had used archival material from the IDF’s archives as well as material based on the open protocols of the trials of those army commanders and soldiers involved in the massacre, Hadashot established that the slaughter was carried out against the background of the military plan devised by the Israeli army on the eve of the 1956 war. On 29 October, the day the Israeli army launched its attack on Egypt in the south, the Israeli Border Guard carried out a large massacre in the Israeli Arab village of Kafr Qassim, in the Little Triangle bordering the West Bank. This episode underlined the fact that the disproportionate use of force formed an important element in Israel's policy towards the Arab citizens throughout the period of the Military Government, which lasted until 1966. Ostensibly, the cause of this extensively documented massacre was the breaking of a curfew by the victims, who were not aware that a curfew had been imposed on their village and neighbouring Arab communities. In his book The Arabs in Israel, Sabri Jiryis, hints at a possible role played by the army Chief of Staff, Moshe Dayan, and the Commanding Officer of the Central Command, General Tzvi Tzur, in the orders given to the army and the Border Guard.

A description of the events at Kafr Qassim was recorded by the Israeli military court: On the eve of the Sinai War...a battalion [brigade] attached to the Central Area Command was ordered to prepare itself to defend a section of the Israeli- Jordanian frontier....a unit [battalion] of the Frontier [Border] Guard was attached to the said battalion [brigade] and the commander of this Frontier Guard unit, Major Shmuel...
Melinki [Malinki], was placed under the orders of the battalion [brigade] commander, Brigadier [Colonel] Yshishkhar [Issachar] Shadmi. In the morning of 29 October 1956, the Commander of the Central Area, Major General Zvi Tsur [sic] informed Brigadier Shadmi and the other battalion commanders of the policy it had been decided to adopt toward the Arab population.

The area commander went on to emphasize to the battalion commanders that the safeguarding of the operation in the south [the Suez campaign] required that the area coterminous with Jordan be kept absolutely quiet.

...Brigadier Shadmi requested that he be empowered to impose a night curfew in the villages of the minorities in the area under his command in order to: a) facilitate the movements of his forces, and b) prevent the population being exposed to injury by the reserve troops. These arguments convinced the area commander, who empowered Brigadier Shadmi to impose a curfew....

On the same day Brigadier Shadmi summoned Major Melinki [sic] to his headquarters, informed him of the duties of the unit under his command, and gave him instructions about the execution of these duties. One of the duties of this Frontier Guard unit was to impose the curfew....The two commanders agreed that the curfew should be enforced between 5 P.M. and 6 A.M.

The battalion [brigade] commander [Shadmi] also told the unit commander [Malinki] that the curfew must be extremely strict and that strong measures must be taken to enforce it. It would not be enough to arrest those who broke it-they must be shot. In explanation he said, "A dead man [or according to other evidence "a few dead men"] is better than the complications of detention."

When Melinki [sic] asked what was to happen to a man returning from his work outside the village, with-out knowing about the curfew, who might well meet the Frontier Guard units at the entrance to the village, Shadmi replied: "I don't want any sentimentality" and "That's just too bad for him." 126

A similar order was issued by Major Malinki to the reserve forces attached to his battalion, shortly before the curfew was enforced: "No inhabitant shall be allowed to leave his home during the curfew. Anyone leaving his home shall be shot; there shall be no arrests." 127 Explicit instructions were given by Malinki to his officers and policemen-soldiers to "shoot to kill all who broke the curfew," including women and children. 128

The evidence produced by Hadashot shows that it would be impossible to comprehend fully the extent of the massacre without knowing about the expulsion plan within which the slaughter was carried out. "Operation Hafarferet" was a contingency plan formulated under the direction of Dayan, who six years earlier had stated before the Secretariat of Mapai that he supported the transfer of all Israeli Arabs out of the country. 129 This military plan was designed on the eve of the 1956 Sinai War to evacuate the Arab population of the Little Triangle by force, within the framework of a possible war with Jordan. Throughout the early 1950s, leading establishment figures such as Dayan continued to speak of an opportunity that might enable Israel to conquer the West Bank. 130

Dan Horowitz (whose influential father, David Horowitz, was the Governor of the Bank of Israel), who, as a young journalist, had covered the trial of the officers involved in the Kafr Qassim massacre for the daily Davar, said that during the trial the main topic of conversation in the Jerusalem court's corridors had been "Operation Hafarferet." In his opinion, formed on the basis of the conversations and rumors then circulating in the court's corridors,
Operation Hafarferet was designed to create a provocation among the Arab population, to force it to carry out illegal acts, and then to expel it. To frighten them and then to evacuate them. And it seems there were yearnings for this way of expelling Arabs.\textsuperscript{131}

Only 30 minutes separated the announcement of the curfew from its harsh enforcement, and the villagers deliberately had been given no cause for the treatment they received. Within an hour of the curfew, between 5 and 6 p.m., forty-seven villagers returning from work were killed. The forty-three killed at the western entrance of Kafr Qassim included seven boys and girls and nine women between the ages of 18 and 61. The victims, returning from work mostly on bicycles, mule carts, or trucks (and a few on foot), through the main road, were stopped by Border Guard soldiers, who ordered them to get out of their transport and then shot them at a close range with automatic weapons and rifles. Several other villagers were wounded.\textsuperscript{132}

Major Shmuel Malinki, the commander of the Border Guard battalion, which was attached to the army brigade of Colonel Issachar Shadmi and sent to the area to enforce the curfew, was given this contingency plan which had been worked out in anticipation of the outbreak of the 1956 war. This plan, named in the army's official records as plan "S-59," was referred to by all army commanders involved as "Operation Hafarferet." The plan included the imposition of a general curfew on the Arab villages of the Little Triangle in the first stage, to be followed by the total evacuation of the inhabitants of these villages in the case of war with Jordan. In the course of the preparation for the 1956 war, "Operation Hafarferet" was taken off the shelf, and army officers down to the level of company commanders were drilled in connection with its implementation. At the same time ordinary Border Guard policemen-soldiers learned about its existence through whispering and private conversations. Also significantly, the curfew which was ordered by the Commanding Officer of the Central Command, General Tzvi Tzur, was part of this contingency plan. During the trial of Shadmi, which opened on 2 November 1958, Colonel Haim Hertzog (later President of Israel), who in 1956 had been Commanding Officer of the Jerusalem District, testified that "the order of [General] Tzur for the curfew was correct in the light of S-57, S-58, and S-59. The order for Shadmi’s sector was logical. Although S-59 was canceled, the background remained."\textsuperscript{133} Also, Dayan testified at the same trial of Shadmi that he "knows about the above-mentioned documents [including S-59], and therefore he sees the order [for the curfew?] as certainly reasonable."\textsuperscript{134} (On 26 February 1959, two years and four months after the massacre, Shadmi was found by the court guilty of a mere "technical error" and was sentenced to a reprimand and a token fine of one piastre.)

The implementation of Operation Hafarferet apparently was canceled at the highest level in conjunction with the cancellation of the war plans against Jordan and "Hafarferet" was put back on the shelf. It is not clear, however, when Operation Hafarferet was returned to the shelf and when Major Malinki, whose battalion was given the task of enforcing the curfew and subsequently was involved in the atrocities, received the cancellation notice. In any event, no alternative plan was made available to local commanders to replace Operation Hafarferet. Consequently, these commanders went along with the orders of imposing the strict, early curfew, which was an integral part of Operation Hafarferet. In his trial, Shadmi testified:

I had not requested that the curfew be brought forward. I had requested a curfew which had already been planned, and had been presented to me as a given fact according to a certain planning. I mean "Hafarferet," which had been presented to me as a solution, and at a certain moment they told me that this would not be fulfilled.\textsuperscript{135}
Without having an alternative plan, both Colonel Shadmi and Major Malinki still saw Operation Hafarferet as the right framework within which to impose the 5 P.M. curfew on the Little Triangle's villages on 29 October 1956. On the initiative of Malinki, in particular, Operation Hafarferet in fact had become the only framework for the curfew. In his instructions to his officers and policemen-soldiers, Malinki pointed out that the curfew was to be imposed according to Operation Hafarferet, although its accompanying stages, including "arrests, confiscations and transfer of villages" would not be implemented. Explicit orders were given by Malinki: to "shoot to kill all who broke the curfew," including women and children; "No inhabitant shall be allowed to leave his home during the curfew. Anyone leaving his home shall be shot; there shall be no arrests." In the circumstances, Malinki later testified in Shadmi's trial, Operation Hafarferet was most suitable, because the cancellation of the war situation in the Jordanian sector was not absolute:

Shadmi said that our role is defensive, but there is room for change....If Shadmi was saying that the policy of [people] in high level was not to harm the Arab minority, and that the Arabs should be treated as citizens of the state, I would have canceled my orders immediately. But there was no trace of these words [in Shadmi's orders].

According to Rotlevi's version, there was an additional objective for the operation:

"In the material reaching my hands, components of Operation Hafarferet are mentioned explicitly: transfer of residents, confiscations, transfer of villages......"

Shalom 'Offer himself read a written statement in court in 1958: "I understood that the order [to shoot to kill all who broke the curfew?] was right and it ought to be carried out, because the state wants to frighten the Arabs and perhaps to remove them."

In an interview in 1991, 'Offer had this to add:

In conversations we had in the [army] company [in 1956] in connection with the problems of the Arabs, operations which had been carried out against the Arab population in 1948 were very often mentioned, and it was explained that it was the policy of the government to remove the Arabs from their villages, in order that the state would not suffer from an internal enemy. Therefore actions were carried out in which forces entered Arab villages, and they were firing at them salvos, killing people and causing their flight.

Initially, official efforts were made to hush up the matter and questions asked by Communist Knesset Member Tawfiq Tubi were expunged from the records. The massacre was kept secret for two weeks, but soon the news of the atrocities leaked out. Even as the Ben-Gurion government tried to cover up the extent of the massacre from the Jewish population, certain circles in Israel were spreading the news of the atrocities among the Arab citizens with the aim of "encouraging" them to leave the country. Ben-Gurion was against bringing the commanders responsible for the massacre to trial; only after realizing the extent of the publicity the news of the atrocities was attracting, did he acquiesce in the holding of the trials. For many years afterward he remained unhappy with these trials and their outcomes.

Eleven officers and soldiers of the Border Guard were court-martialled by the army. The trial was conducted in camera. Major Shmuel Malinki and Lieutenant Gabriel Dahan were found guilty of the killings and sentenced to 17 and 15 years respectively, a relatively light punishment for the major crime committed. Other officers and soldiers involved in the massacre also were given light sentences of various prison terms. The court placed the blame on one army unit alone, failing to trace up the chain of command those who had issued the orders and devised Operation Hafarferet.
The official Israeli attitude to these convictions was even more telling. Various authorities made a great deal of effort to lighten and reduce the sentences. The convicted men soon were pardoned, apparently with Ben-Gurion's blessing, and the last person was released from prison by the end of 1959, about three years after the massacre. Equally remarkable, in September 1960 the municipality of Ramle was about to appoint Gabriel Dahan as an officer for Arab affairs; only after pressure from some local councilors was his appointment canceled. However, the Jewish Agency later gave Dahan a job as manager of the sale of Israel's government bonds in a European capital.  

Perhaps the most revealing of all was the sentence given to the army commander, Colonel Shadmi. He earlier had been described by the first military court, which tried other commanders, as responsible for the killing to a greater extent than any of the other persons involved. However, the second court which tried Shadmi found him guilty (on 26 February 1959) of a mere "technical error" and sentenced him to a reprimand and a fine of one piastre, perhaps as a symbol of exoneration for any person higher up.

The 1956-1957 Occupation of the Gaza Strip and Sinai:

On 29 October 1956, the Israelis invaded the Gaza Strip and Sinai, holding both areas for four months before strong international, and especially American, pressure eventually forced them to evacuate both areas. Originally, the Israelis had every intention of staying in what their government considered to be an integral part of the Land of Israel. According to The New York Times of 2 November 1956, some 1,000 Palestinians were thought to have fled from the Gaza Strip to Jordan and Syria. The true figure of the 1956 evacuees, however, may have been much higher, although, clearly far smaller in comparison to the 1948 exodus, or even the subsequent 1967 one. The London Times correspondent had reported from Gaza on the evening of 1 November about Israeli bombing aircraft:

darkly flashing Spitfires and Mustangs dived over Gaza and violet dust rose where shells and bombs had just burst........Earlier this afternoon that narrow gateway [the old road between Gaza and El Arish] was choked with fleeing Arab refugees, barefooted or riding distracted donkeys. Many of the refugees had taken to the sea in frail little boats. From this correspondent's point of vantage Gaza itself, seen through failing light and a screen of smoke, looked as if it had been emptied of the refugee multitude that was lodged inside it or in camps along the dunes after the Israel-Arab war of 1948.  

The vast majority of the refugees and other residents in the Strip, however, stayed put.

I) The Massacres of Khan Yunis and Rafah, 3 and 12 November 1956:
The Israeli military victory was swift and complete. The Israeli forces entered the Gaza Strip on 1 November, and Gaza City fell after a three-hour fight on the morning of 2 November. At 10 A.M. that morning Gaza was surrendered by the general commanding the 8th Division of the Egyptian army. By 3 November Israel's lightning conquest of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip was almost complete. Arab resistance was neither strong nor organized. However, there is ample evidence to suggest that the Israeli occupation of 1956-57 was characterized by widespread brutality, especially in its early days, perhaps in order to terrorize the Palestinians into fleeing from the teeming refugee camps. In fact, the goal of dispersing the residents of the refugee camps was much in evidence throughout the 1956-57 occupation. Several hundred civilians were massacred by the Israeli army, the worst incidents of which were at Khan Yunis and Rafah on 3 November and 12 November 1956 respectively. The motive behind these atrocities was the same one as at Dayr Yasin in 1948—to intimidate the population of the Gaza Strip to flee. One of the worst incidents took
place at Khan Yunis on 3 November (four days after the Kafr Qassim massacre), when the Israeli army occupied the town and its neighbouring refugee camp. On the same day a twenty-four hour curfew was declared by the army, officially to check looting or disorder. A Khan Yunis resident, Abu Talal, recalled:

At dawn, just before 5 A.M., we heard voices in the street and the next thing I knew, someone was kicking our door down. All my family was gathered in the back room; my mother, my wife who was seven months pregnant, three brothers, two sisters and my two daughters, aged six and four....When the soldiers came in, we did not even know which country they were from. We had heard talk about British and French troops. One of the soldiers shouted in Arabic "Stand still!" Then he opened fire on me with his rifle, hitting me in the elbow. I ran back into the room and my family held the door open for me. The soldiers fired again and my younger brother was killed instantly. My third brother was shot in the legs as he tried to climb out of the window. A second soldier then came into the room, took one look around and then emptied his rifle at random round the room. I was hit again in my leg and chest. Then they took all the women outside leaving the injured, myself and my brother, inside. My mother started to curse the soldiers and I remember one of them beating her with his rifle butt shouting "Don't curse the Israelis, you should be cursing Abdel Nasser."

I don't know why they chose my house. I wasn't anyone special. I heard later that the same thing had happened in many houses in our quarter alone. People were just chosen at random--ordinary people who had no connection with politics or the fedayeen. Outside I could hear a lot of shouting and shooting coming from the Khan in the town centre. Later, I heard that dozens of people had been lined up to the wall and shot in cold blood. Some say thousands were killed, but I think that 600 is probably near the truth. There were corpses everywhere, and because of the curfew, no-one could go out to bury them for about four days. This all took place that first morning. So much killing in such a short space of time. I heard that it was stopped by a senior officer.

I lay on my back on the floor of the bedroom in my house for 30 hours with blood everywhere....We couldn't get out to the clinic because of the curfew....When the curfew was finally lifted, I was able to get to the clinic on a stretcher. That's when I saw all the bodies in the streets.\(^{146}\)

More accurate figures were produced by a subsequent investigation made by UNRWA officials who found that 275 Arab civilians were killed by the Israeli army at Khan Yunis and the adjacent refugee camp on 3 November and 111 other civilians were killed at the Rafah refugee camp, mostly on 12 November. UNRWA officials also strongly protested about these civilian deaths, in particular the murder of eight of its local employees.\(^{147}\)

According to an account in The New York Times of 2 December, "United Nations truce personnel said their information indicated that 400 to 500 persons were killed at Khan Yunis during the first days of the occupation, 700 at Rafah and thirty to fifty in the town of Gaza." These officers also added that "physicians of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency had compiled a list of eighty-four civilians known to have been killed in Rafah." Moreover, Dr. James Young, Director of the American Baptist Hospital in Gaza said that his "institution had treated 165 civilians wounded by Israeli troops, including 118 men, thirty-six women and eleven children. Eight have died of wounds, including two children."\(^{148}\)
In March 1957, after the Israelis withdrew from the Strip, a mass grave was unearthed at Khan Yunis containing the bodies of forty Arabs who had been shot in the back of the head after their hands had been tied.149

II) Other Atrocities in Sinai, November 1956:

There were other atrocities committed by the Israeli army during the 1956 war or shortly after. On 4 August 1995, the Hebrew daily Ma’ariv revealed some details of large-scale atrocities for the first time. An extensive investigative report by Israeli journalist Ronal Fisher, based on Israeli academic research, exposed atrocities that had been committed by the elite paratroop battalion 890 commanded by Raphael Eitan (who later became the army Chief of Staff from 1978 to 1983, and was criticized by the Israeli Kahan Commission of Inquiry for his failure to try to prevent the September 1982 massacres at Sabra and Shatilla in Beirut. Eitan is currently the leader of the right-wing Tzomet Party and Minister of Agriculture and Environment in the current Likud cabinet of Binyamin Netanyahu). Apparently in late October and early November 1956 Eitan gave the order that resulted in his troops murdering some 273 unarmed Egyptian prisoners during the Sinai War. This figure included 49 Egyptian civilian road workers, who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. They all were executed by a platoon headed by Captain Arie Biro, who subsequently became a brigadier general in the Israeli army.150 In an interview published in Ma’ariv on 4 August 1995, Biro provided further details about these atrocities, talking openly and even unrepentantly about his personal involvement in them.151 The 49 Egyptian road workers, all dressed in white galabias (the loose, shirt-like garment, that is typical dress for the male population of Egypt), were picked up by Battalion 890 on the eastern side of the Mitla Pass on 29 October and were taken prisoner. On 30 October they all were executed after their hands had been tied by a platoon headed by Captain Biro.152 At Ras Sudar, another 56 Egyptians were shot dead, including 20 unarmed prisoners murdered with their hands tied behind their backs. Army Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan apparently knew about the Ras Sudar incident but did nothing to punish the perpetrators.153 On the road from Ras Sudar to Sharm El-Shaykh another 168 unarmed Egyptian and Sudanese soldiers were shot dead, often in the back, during the last stage of the war.154

III) Expulsion of Galilee Bedouin, 30 October 1956 (by Yitzhak Rabin):

Operation Hafarferet, although resulting in the infamous massacre of Kafr Qassim, never was implemented fully. Jordan gave Israel no pretext for action and the expulsions did not occur. It must be seen, however, as part of a general tendency among the politico-military establishment in Israel to exploit the 1956 war to carry out large-scale expulsions of Israeli Arab communities, particularly those situated along the borders, in the name of security. Although this operation was put back on the shelf and the Kafr Qassim massacre failed to drive the inhabitants of the Little Triangle into flight, the Israeli army did succeed in carrying out a mass expulsion at the same time in another part of the country. On 30 October 1956, only one day after the Kafr Qassim massacre, General Yitzhak Rabin, then Commanding Officer of the Northern Command, exploited the attack against Egypt in the south to carry out a mass expulsion of Israeli Arabs across the northern border into Syria. This little-known episode, which was revealed by Rabin himself in his “Service Notebook,” involved the expulsion to Syria of 2,000-5,000 inhabitants of the two villages Krad al-Ghannama and Krad al-Baqqara, to the south of Lake Hula. These people already had been evicted from their native villages by the Israeli army in 1951 in the course of water diversion projects. Then (in 1951) the UN Security Council had passed a resolution calling on Israel to halt work on the water diversion projects and to enable the villagers to return to their homes. In the meantime, however, the Israeli army had blown up all the houses in the two villages in order to block their return. In his memoirs, Rabin wrote:
I solved one problem in the north by exploiting the fighting against the Egyptians [in the south] and........... we [the army] transferred about 2,000 Arabs, who had been a burdensome security problem [across the Jordan River into Syria].

Referring to the same episode in an interview in early November 1982, on the 26th anniversary of the Sinai war, Rabin (then a member of the Knesset) said that "during Operation Kadesh [the code name of the Sinai operation] in 1956, the IDF expelled between 3,000 and 5,000 Arab villagers, residents of the Galilee, to Syria." When Rabin was asked by the interviewer what was the reaction of the villagers to their expulsion, he replied: "I did not take in this matter a democratic decision."

There were no international repercussions to this 1956 episode in the Galilee. International attention was focused on the fighting in the south and the Suez Canal Crisis. It is likely that a single plan underlay this mass expulsion from Galilee and Operation Hafarferet: to exploit the war situation in the south and the invasion of Sinai for carrying out mass expulsions of Israeli Arabs in the name of security. Of course, the expulsion of over 40,000 residents from the Little Triangle would have been far more difficult than was the case of the few thousand people in the north, who were confined to an isolated area along the Syrian border and cut off from the outside world since their eviction from their villages by the Israeli army in 1951.

The 1967 Exodus: Why Did the Palestinians Leave?
In his study of the 1967 exodus, William Harris found that the exodus from the West Bank involved up to 250,000 people and was by far the largest out-movement of Palestinians caused by the 1967 hostilities. Harris also estimated the population loss of the Gaza Strip between June and December 1967 at 70,000. In total some 320,000 Palestinians were expelled from the West Bank and Gaza in the course of the hostilities or shortly after. An important body of new evidence has been unearthed in recent years, much of it appearing in the form of investigative articles in the Hebrew press, which sheds new light on the events surrounding the 1967 exodus. Below I will attempt to examine the causes of the 1967 exodus in the light of this new historical evidence, and more

The June War of 1967 marks a decisive turn in the history of Zionism, the Israeli State and the Palestinians, particularly those living in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Zionism at last had reached its aim of controlling the whole of Palestine. Moreover, the overwhelming Israeli victory in the war, the seizure of the remainder of Palestine with its sizable Arab population, the resultant outburst, and later upsurge, of messianic Zionism and the growing Israeli confidence all contributed to the prompt and inevitable revival of the "transfer" concept.

I) The Israeli Cabinet Meetings of 15-

General Moshe Dayan was appointed Defense Minister on the eve of the 1967 war and retained this powerful post until 1974. He was the most famous and typical exponent of Israeli post-1967 expansionism and the de facto integration of the occupied territories into Israel. Dayan instituted a policy of "creeping annexation," a process by which Israeli administration, jurisdiction, and law gradually, incrementally, and draconianlly were imposed on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in ever-expanding areas, yet without a comprehensive act of legal annexation. That process, also
described as de facto annexation, generally is seen in the actual transformation of the demographic and physical realities of these areas.

The Israeli government, the Dayan-headed Defense Ministry, and the Mossad (the Israeli June war. This method of secret transfer activities, as well as transfer discussions at cabinet level, gradually had been revealed by Israeli journalists and researchers as well as politicians. Examples of these revelations are the research of Meir Avidan, published in Davar on 2, 5, and 19 June 1987, and the articles published by two Israeli journalists, Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, who published an article in the Washington Post on 7 February 1988 entitled "Expelling Palestinians." The same article appeared in the Guardian Weekly (London) two weeks later under the title "A Final Solution of the Palestinian Problem?" and was similar to an article in the Hebrew daily Davar by the authors, which appeared around the same time and was entitled "This is the History of Transfer."159

Avidan, Melman, and Raviv reveal that less than two weeks after the Israeli victory in the war of June 1967, the Eshkol cabinet convened for a number of secret meetings, held between the 15 and 19 June 1967, to discuss a major issue: What to do about the "demographic problem"--the fact that the bulk of the Arab population of the territories--contrary to 1948--remain in situ. The official transcript of the meeting remains secret. However, according to private diaries kept and notes taken by Ya'akov Hertzog--brother of Haim Hertzog, President of Israel from 1983 to 1993--who was at the time director-general of the Prime Minister's office, both the Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir and the Foreign Minister Abba Eban, called for settling the Palestinian refugees in neighbouring countries.160 Relying on Avidan's research, Melman and Raviv point out that at these meetings "sentiment seemed to favour Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon's proposal that Palestinian refugees be transported to the Sinai Desert and that Palestinians should be persuaded to move abroad."161 According to Hertzog's notes, Allon complained at the meeting of 15 June: "We do not do enough among the Arabs to encourage emigration."162 At the same meeting Menahem Begin, then minister without portfolio, recommended the demolition of the refugee camps and the transfer of their residents to El Arish in Sinai, which had been captured from Egypt.163 Begin's proposal also was supported by the Labour leader and Minister of Transport Moshe Carmel at these discussions.164

Avidan also reveals that the Ministerial Committee for Defense decided on 15 June 1967 that: "Israel with demand from the Arab countries and the superpowers to start preparing an elementary plan to solve the refugee problem, which would include the settlement of refugees in Iraq, Syria, (Egypt?), Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, and other countries (in the presentation of this demand emphasis will be made on the fact of population exchange," that is, that the settlement of the refugees will come in the place of the Jews who left Arab countries.165 Apparently a ministerial committee was set up to look into ways of "solving the refugee problem."166 A few weeks after the June discussions, Dayan went even further, publicly declaring that the resettlement of the refugees must be carried out in the Jordanian kingdom across the river.167

The product of the June discussions was not a total relocation of the refugee camps' residents to the Sinai desert but rather a "voluntary" transfer plan, designed to "thin out" the population of the Old City of Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza, which later became known as the Moshe Dayan plan. Immediately after the June 1967 war Dayan consolidated a plan for encouraging Arab emigration from the occupied territories to South America.168 The scheme began with the formation of a secret unit charged with "encouraging" the departure of the Palestinians for foreign shores. The secret unit was composed of representatives of the Prime Minister's office, the Defense Ministry and
the Israel Defense Forces. Some patchy revelations about the same secret scheme also were made by General `Uzi Narkiss, Commanding General of the Central Command until 1968--with responsibility for the West Bank--who told an interviewer in October 1988 that after the June 1967 war

some of the Mossad men came to me...and then they offered some [Arab] individuals sums [of money] in exchange for them leaving their property [in the Old City of Jerusalem and the West Bank]....These sums were part of the government allocations for this matter. Some agreed, but the experiment failed; it succeeded only with several scores, until one of our daughters was killed--as a revenge--in our embassy in Paraguay, then the operation was stopped.169

meeting of the executive of the International Centre for Peace in the Middle East dated 1 June 1995. 

encouraging Palestinian emigration from the West Bank and Gaza to south America. Under this scheme, each Arab family which agreed to cooperate received sums ranging from 3,000 to 5,000 US dollars. However, in the end, according to Weitz, the project ended in failure: scores of Arab families from the West Bank which accepted the Israeli proposals and travelled to Latin America did not succeed in establishing themselves there and after a certain period returned to their homes on the West Bank.170 According to reports in the Israeli press, a total of about one thousand

- May 1970) the plan continued.171

II) The Eviction and Destruction of the al-Magharbe Quarter (in the Old City of Jerusalem), 11 June 1967:
The June 1967 war began suddenly and ended quickly. In his recent book Intimate Enemies (1995), Meron Benvenisti, former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, writes:

At the end of the 1967 war, there were attempts to implement a forced population transfer. Residents of cities and villages in areas near the cease-fire line were expelled from their

In fact in the course of hostilities and in the immediate aftermath of the June 1967 War, with its rapidly changing circumstances, and particularly given the fact that most Western governments applauded the overwhelming Israeli victory, Defense Minister Dayan and other army generals (including `Uzi Narkiss, Haim Hertzog, and Shlomo Lahat) found an ideal opportunity to drive out tens of thousands of Arabs from their villages, towns and refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In their article in Davar of 19 February 1988 entitled "This is the History of Transfer," the Israeli journalists Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv pointed out that the Israeli conception of "exploiting opportunities to transfer Arab populations, which was first employed in 1948, resurfaced shortly after the 1967 War: commanders in various ranks of the army believed that the wind blowing from the political echelon was calling for the exploiting of opportunity to thin out the Palestinian population."

Among the first evictees were the residents of the ancient al-Magharbe quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem. They were turned out of their homes on 11 June, two days after the capture of East Jerusalem by the Israeli military, after 3 hou

173 Apparently the quarter was completely demolished because it was located immediately adjacent to the southern part of the
Wailing Wall, the Western Wall of al-Haram al-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary). Its inhabitants, about 135 families (or some 650-1,000 persons), were the beneficiaries of an ancient and important Islamic Waqf foundation originally established in 1193 by al-Malik al-Afdal, the son of Salah al-Din. Its obliteration in June 1967 resulted also in the destruction of several historic religious sites (including two mosques, two zawiyas and a great number of endowed residences) which the quarter contained.  

The Old City of Jerusalem was captured by the Israeli army on 7 June 1967. In his book Jerusalem: A City Without a Wall, described in detail the circumstances surrounding the destruction of this ancient Muslim quarter. The story began on 7 June, while Israeli paratroopers were advancing through the alleys of the Old City of Jerusalem, an engineering corps officer in the Central Command, Eytan Ben-Moshe, approached Shlomo Lahat, a senior military officer in the Central Command and the designated military governor of Jerusalem (and subsequently mayor of Tel Aviv) and proposed the demolition to the Wailing Wall. In fact, Defence Minister Dayan had already requested from Lahat, before the latter had arrived in Jerusalem, be able to visit the Wailing Wall during the forthcoming feast of Shavuoth (Pentecost). This seemed to suggest that the original idea to level at least part of the quarter came from Dayan. 

and Haim Hetzog) as well as Dayan, the mayor of West Jerusalem Teddy Kollek and former Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion were all involved, one way or another, either in the initial decision or in the actual implementation of the systematic operation to destroy the Arab quarter. 

To begin with, Lahat approved of Ben- see below). Moreover, on 8 June former premier Ben-Gurion, accompanied by Teddy Kollek and visited the Wailing Wall. Both Ben-Gurion and Kollek were strongly in favour of the removal of Arab buildings adjacent to the Wailing Wall. Kollek, who had long been closely associated with Ben-Gurion and who had been elected mayor of West Jerusalem in 1965, appeared to have played a central role in the formulation and implementation of the decision to demolish the al-Magharbe quarter in June 1967. Apparently, he also informed t -- do it quickly, and let  

In addition to Defence Minister Dayan, who represented the civil authority as well as approving and controlling the conduct of the field commanders, and, as we shall tacit ministerial approval of the action. 

However, the actual order to evict the quarter and destroy its houses was given by Shlomo Lahat, then the Commander of Jerusalem, with the express approval of `Uzi Narkiss, Commanding General of the Central Command, whose approval was given at a meeting with Lahat on 9 June. apartment to discuss basic information about the Wailing Wall and the al-Magharbe quarter. The r of the National Parks Authority, the historian and archaeologist professor Michael Avi- assistant. Kollek explained to the participants the reasons for this urgent meeting:
The al-Magharbe quarter adjacent to the Wailing Wall must be demolished. The responsibility for executing the plan will be in the hands of the National Parks Authority in order to give the matter as far as possible an unofficial character. The department of antiquities in the ministry of education and the Israel Defence Force are not interested in involvement, publicly, in the execution of the plan, although they both bless it and will

Kollek put Tanai in charge of executing the operation possibly seeking to bestow upon it a civilian legitimacy. Central to the planning and mode of procedure by Kollek and his technical as the need to act speedily in order to stave off internal criticism and potential obstruction and avoid attracting too much attention by the foreign media. At noon (10 June) Kollek and his colleagues proceeded to the area of the Wailing Wall and decided on the spot to bulldoze the entire Arab quarter with the aim of creating a vast plaza for the Wailing Wall. Kollek also got in touch with several Jerusalem construction companies and asked them to make earth moving equipment available and undertake the d

While the actual demolition job was partly assigned to a civilian body called the guild of rendered the needed assistance. Sometime during the afternoon or the evening of the same day (10 June) an army officer went from one house to another ordering the residents of the quarter to move out. When many families refused to leave their homes, an army unit moved in and evicted the bulk of the inhabitants by force. Meanwhile two bulldozers and other heavy tools were assembled by the engineering corps and those in charge of the operation sought to complete the whole work on the night of 10-11 June. Commenting on this driven urgency by those responsible for the deed, Benziman explained:

Those who were presiding over the destruction of the [Arab] neighbourhood assumed that their action was motivated neither by security [considerations] nor by mere town planning. They were driven that night [10-11 June] by an almost mystical feeling: that, in their eyes, they were the representatives of the Jewish people, who came to assert [Jewish] sovereignty over its most sacred site........the fate of 135 Arab families, who were the victims of these

The speed with which the Israeli authorities sought to carry out the leveling of the Arab residential houses was also evident in the fact that in the same evening one demolished wall of a house revealed an unconscious, badly injured, middle-aged Arab women. By midnight she was dead.

11 June and ordered that the leveling be completed speedily. More men and heavy tools were brought in. In the afternoon of the same day Defence Minister Dayan appeared on the site. He also ordered Lahat to complete the leveling of the quarter very quickly, possibly in order not to let foreign journalists see the remains of the destroyed Arab quarter. In fact only muted internal questioning of the leveling of the quarter was made by the minister of religious affairs as well as

However, backed by the powerful Defence Minister (Dayan)-- who conducted the June 1967 war with great independence-- Narkiss and Lahat managed easily to ignore the above-mentioned criticism and pursued the policy of leveling and forcible evacuation with and without the approval of the civilian authorities. (In the case of the al-
Magharbe quarter there was active cooperation with Kollek and other civil authorities. Benziman believed that:

The policy of evacuation and demolition continued only for several days after the [Israeli army] entrance into the city within the walls. It was executed at the initiative of middle military echelons and with the tacit approval of senior level command. There was lack of communication between the civil authorities and the military government; in practice the latter exercised civilian functions. The military echelons, on its own responsibility, encouraged the Arab residents to get out of Jerusalem and other cities in the West Bank and to go to the East Bank [of Jordan].

The evicted residents of the al-Magharbe quarter were dispersed in West Bank villages close to Jerusalem (such as Shu'fat, Bayt Hanina, and Silwan) as well as in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem. None of the Israeli government ministries was prepared to accept responsibility for the demolition of the quarter, and no attempt was made to offer the evictees alternative accommodation. Like the eviction of the large three villages in the Latrun area (see below), this removal should be treated as an internal expulsion rather than transfer out of the occupied territories. However, it is extremely important to remember that these cases of internal expulsions had a psychological effect on the 1967 exodus from the West Bank to Jordan, helping (almost certainly) to precipitate and encourage further exodus out of the country, especially in the first few weeks following the war.

The evictions and leveling of the al-Magharbe quarter were only the beginning of the sweeping changes carried out by the Israeli authorities in the Old City of Jerusalem. On 17 June 1967 at 4 a.m. the Israeli army ordered the inhabitants of the former Jewish quarter and the surrounding houses to leave the premises within 24 hours. Apparently this measure affected several hundred Palestinian families who, according to the 1967 Jerusalem Diary of Sister Marie-Therese, could be observed all day carrying their belongings through the alleys of Jerusalem. Some of them were able to find refuge with relatives and friends. But the majority had to leave the town. In the Old City's Jewish quarter and its surrounding districts, over 4,000 Palestinians were evicted to make possible the reconstruction of a vastly enlarged and completely "Jewish" quarter, excluding its former Arab residents.

The destruction of the al-Magharbe quarter should be seen as part of a wider internal debate that took place during and after the 1967 war about the future of the Muslim shrines in the Old City of Jerusalem, particularly the third holiest site for Islam: al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock. In this connection a recent revelation made in the Hebrew daily Haaretz of 31 December 1997, revealed the details of an extraordinary conversation that took place between General Narkiss and from 1973 to 1983, in June 1967. In an interview given to Haaretz shortly before his death in late 1997, Narkiss recalled that only a few hours after the Old City was captured by the Israeli army he was urged by Rabbi Goren to blow up the third holiest shrines for Islam. Narkiss had this to say:

The paratroopers wandered around the plaza [on the Temple Mount] as if in a dream.....Rabbi Shlomo Goren was among them. I was alone for a moment, lost in thought, when Rabbi explosives into the Mosque of Omar [the Dome of the Rock] so we may rid ourselves of it history if you do this.......This is an opportunity that can be taken advantage of now, at this
Dome of the Rock and the al-
blown it up. It is a tragedy

192 Whether or not the third holiest shrines for Islam came close to being
blown up by Israeli paratroopers immediately after they were captured in June 1967 remains an open
question. However, in the 1980s members of a militant Jewish group (Hamahteret Hayehudit) were
arrested and put on trial for plotting to blow up these shrines. Clearly the destruction of these shrine
remains a most vivid fear for Palestinians and Muslims and an ambition for most extremist Jewish
fundamentalist in Israel.

-Burj:
Also among the first to go were the inhabitants of the three ancient villages of 'Imwas (Emmaus of
the New Testament) Yalu and Bayt Nuba, situated near the Green Line in the Latrun area northwest
of Jerusalem. In 1987 these evicted villagers and their descendants numbered about 11,000 in
Amman, Jordan, and 2,000 who lived on the West Bank, near Ramallah.193 Latrun was on a West
Bank salient, 20 miles from Tel Aviv and some 15 from West Jerusalem. It had been the gateway to
Jerusalem in 1948, which the Israelis failed repeatedly to capture, so they had to realign the roadway
to bypass Latrun. For many years before 1967 the Israeli army had plans for taking over the Latrun
Arab villages without moving on beyond the enclave.194 June 1967 created the opportunity to
realize these plans. The Latrun salient was captured by the Israeli army on the morning of 6 June
1967. On orders (not in writing, of course) from Commanding General of the Central Command
'Uzi Narkiss, the army bulldozers moved in and wiped out the three large villages, due to their

195 Narkiss (a Labour party man who later became Director
General of the Jewish Agency's (JA) Department of Immigration and Absorption and is in 1995
chairman of the JA's Department of Information) also commanded the troops who captured
Jerusalem and clearly approved of the order to evict the al-Magharbe quarter.196

The demolition of the Latrun villages was carried out by an engineering unit using

and 550 in Bayt Nuba.197 Some 2,000 families (over 6,000 persons) from the three villages found
themselves on 6 June on the road to Ramallah.198 Those who could, rushed to the East Bank. The

-known Israeli
journalist, who-- as a reservist soldier-- took part in the fighting in the Latrun area, revealed, in
graphic detail, the story of Bayt Nuba:

We were ordered to block the entrances of the villages and prevent inhabitants
returning to the village from their hideouts after they had heard Israeli broadcasts
urging them to go back to their homes. The order was to shoot over their heads and
tell them not to enter the village. Beit Nuba [sic] is built of fine quarry stones; some
of the houses are magnificent. Every house is surrounded by an orchard, olive trees,
apricots, vines and presses. They are well kept. Among the trees there are carefully
tended vegetable beds....At noon the first bulldozer arrived and pulled down the first
house at the edge of the village. Within ten minutes the house was turned into
rubble, including its entire contents; the olive trees, cypresses were all uprooted
After the destruction of three houses the first column arrived from the direction of Ramallah...some Arabic-speaking soldiers went over to notify them of the warning. There were old people who could hardly walk, murmuring old women, mothers carrying babies, small children. The children wept and asked for water. They all carried white flags.

We told them to go to Beit Sura. They told us that they were driven out everywhere, forbidden to enter any village, that they were wandering like this for four days, without food, without water, some dying on the road. They asked to return to the village, and said we had better kill them....We did not allow them to enter the village, and take anything....More and more columns of refugees arrived, until there were hundreds of them....The platoon commander decided to go to headquarters and find out if there were any orders about what to do with them, where to send them, and whether it was possible to arrange transport for the women and food for the children. He returned saying that there were no orders in writing, simply that they were to be driven out.

We drove them out. They go on wandering in the south like lost cattle. The weak die. In the evening we found that they had not been taken in, for in Beit Sura too bulldozers had begun to destroy the place and they were not allowed to enter. We found out that not only in our sector was the border [the Green Line] straightened out for security reasons but in all other sectors too.

In her 1967 Jerusalem Diary, Sister Marie-Therese wrote:

Nuba] systematically destroyed by dynamite and bulldozers. Alone, in dead silence, donkeys wander among the ruins. Here and there, smashed furniture, a torn cushion protrude from the rubble of stones and cement. A kitchen pot and a blanket abandoned in the middle of the road. They had no time to carry anything away....

According to General Narkiss, the evictees of the "four [sic] villages of the Latrun area" were evacuated to Ramallah and some of them crossed the river to Jordan. In his book The Liberation of Jerusalem, Narkiss wrote: "I was determined that the Latrun enclave, that years-old thorn in our flesh, would never be returned [to Arab sovereignty]."

Canada Park was created with the help of the Canadian Jewish National Fund on the site of the three bulldozed villages and their 20,000 dunums of agricultural lands. Professor Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, of Haifa University, commented:

During most Saturdays every year, hundreds of Israeli families enjoy picnics in the beautiful Canada Park, midway between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The park is a popular place even during the week, and offers visitors olive trees, water springs, Roman antiquities, Byzantine churches and sports facilities........ Canada Park ...... has been developed on the site where three Palestinian villages- Bet Nuba, Yalu and Emmaus [sic] stood before June 1967. Immediately after the June War, these villages were bulldozed and their 5000 inhabitants turned into refugees. The Jewish National Fund got to work; millions were spent turning the land into a huge park, erasing every trace of the villages but lovingly preserving the antiquities.

More recently plans were announced to plant another section of the same site with trees and name it "Scharansky Hope Forest" after Nathan Scharansky, the well-known Zionist activist and former Soviet prisoner, who is a Minister in the current government of Ehud Barak.
In 1969, two years after the destruction of the Latrun villages, Dayan felt it was necessary to remind his compatriots, including those who were opposed to Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Rafah area, in north Sinai--of what some of them, the younger generation, never knew. Dayan had this to say in a 1969 speech at the Technion in Haifa:

We came here to this country, which was settled by Arabs, and we are building a Jewish State .... Jewish villages arose in the place of Arab villages. You do not even know the names [of these villages], and I do not blame you, because those geography books no longer exist. Not only do the books not exist, the Arab villages are not there either. Nahal [Dayan's own settlement] arose in the place of Mahlul, Gvat [a kibbutz] in the place of Jibta, Sarid [another kibbutz] in the place of Haneifis, and Kfar-Yehoshu'a in the place of Tal-Shaman. There is not one single place built in this country that did not have a former Arab population. 206

IV) The Initial Destruction of Qalqilya:

were cleared and raised to the ground, 207 and only the intervention of a group of liberal Israeli intellectuals and academics saved the West Bank town of Qalqilya from a similar fate when an order by the army Central Command for the expulsion of the inhabitants and the total destruction of the whole town was canceled by Dayan. 208 Apparently Zeev Shaham, commander of a force that operated in the area of Qalqilya-head of the Central Command. 209 In deed between 9 June and 18 July 1967 (before the cancellation of the order by Dayan ) at least 850 out of 2,000 dwellings in Qalqilya had been blown up by the Israeli army 210 and dozens of residents were forcibly transported from the town to the Jordan River. 211 At one point Dayan ordered to stop destroying Qalqilya because the whole operation had become widely known and there was public pressure. 212 In her Jerusalem Diary, Sister Marie-Therese wrote:

At Nablus we saw hundreds of families under olive trees; they slept in the open. They told us they were from Qalkilya [sic] and were not allowed to go back. We went to Qalkilya to see what was happening; we received a sinister impression. The city was being blown up by dynamite...... 213

the Hebron district) and Bayt Marsam; most of Habla met a similar fate on 22 June 1967; al-Burj was destroyed on 28 June 1967; Jiftlik on 26 November 1967 and the following days. 214 Reporting simultaneously in the New York Times and on 3 December 1967, Terence Smith wrote:

The village of Jiftlik on the Occupied West Bank of Jordan, with about 6,000 refugee inhabitants, has been completely destroyed by the Israeli army. During the last two weeks, army bulldozers have razed about 800 buildings there........According to certain information, the Israeli army has also destroyed other villages near Latroun [sic] and Hebron. Since these villages had already been severely damaged during the war, some Israelis are saying that it might have been more sensible to have left half-destroyed the standings houses.

In mid-July 1967 John Reddaway, Deputy Commissioner General of UNRWA, estimated that some 16,000 persons had been left homeless after the Israeli army demolished buildings in West Bank villages. 215

Attempts to "thin out" the teeming population of Gaza also were made in the summer of 1967, as a resident of the Strip, Abu Hassan recalled:
A few weeks after the Strip had been occupied, the Israelis embarked on a programme of forced deportation. On one occasion, the Israeli army rounded up all the men from my quarter and herded us into Jaffa school. The Israelis had two local mukhtars with them who told the officer in charge each man's profession--

wanted, put them on trucks and sent them to Jordan. I remember another time the army arrived in trucks early in the morning and grabbed all the young men they could find. Those of us who were around began protesting, but the Israelis told us not to worry because they were only taking the youths for a few hours to help in the disposal of those killed in the Sinai during the war. We never saw those young men again. As soon as the work had been done, their identity papers were confiscated and they were forced to cross the canal into Egypt.216

V) The Operation of Haim Hertzog, Shlomo Lahat, and `Uzi Narkiss, June 1967:
Haim Hertzog was the army's first Military Governor of the West Bank after the June 1967 War. Hertzog had been a political and military broadcaster during the war and published Israel's Finest Hour (1967). He was also a regular radio and television commentator in Israel and abroad and managed to amass honorary doctorates from several universities in Israel and other countries. At a public debate on the Palestinian issue held in Jerusalem on 3 April 1970, this first Military Governor of the West Bank and an influential figure of the Labour establishment, did not refrain from revealing openly his heart's wishes: "if we had the possibility of taking one million Arabs [from the terri

217 However, it was only 21 years later in early November 1991, a few days after the Madrid Peace Conference, that President Hertzog revealed publicly and proudly one of Israel's little known secrets: that he, as the first Military Governor of the West Bank, efficiently organized and carried out, in cooperation with Shlomo Lahat, the commander of Jerusalem, the operation of transferring 200,000 Palestinians from the West Bank in the immediate aftermath of the war. According to a statement confirming that this operation was indeed carried out, the President's office said: "his [Hertzog's] considerations were that in the departing wave many of the PLO men would leave, and this would make it easier for the military administration. For days and weeks lines of buses ran from the Damascus Gate [in East Jerusalem] to the Allenby Bridge [on the River Jordan]. Altogether during this period 200,000 Palestinians left Judea and Samaria voluntarily, including 100,000 refugees whose camps were in the Jericho valley."218

Hertzog claims that he had been prompted to organize this operation during a meeting with Anwar al-Khatib, the former Arab governor of the Jerusalem district, at the Ambassador Hotel in Jerusalem on Friday 9 June 1967. According to Hertzog, al-Khatib raised at this meeting, inter alia, the problem of the families of Arab consuls stranded in Jerusalem and the problem of the families of the Jordanian officers, who fled and left their dependents behind, and asked the Israeli Military Governor to allow these families to leave Jerusalem for Jordan via the Allenby Bridge. Hertzog agreed and told al-Khatib that from the morning of Sunday, 11 June, buses would be waiting near the Damascus Gate to transport any Arab wishing to depart to Jordan, on condition that each departing Arab signed a statement to the effect that he was leaving voluntarily. Hertzog also revealed that Shlomo Lahat, then the commander of Jerusalem and the mayor of Tel Aviv from 1974 until 1993, was put in charge of implementing the operation, and that "no contrary order was given by [Defense Minister] Moshe Dayan at any stage [to halt the operation]."219
Moreover, the superior Commanding General of Hertzog and Lahat, the afore-mentioned Commanding General of the Central Command `Uzi Narkiss, in fact told an interviewer in October 1988 that he himself had supervised the implementation of the transfer operation in 1967, which, according to the interviewer, had resulted in the total "transfer of 100,000 [Palestinians to Jordan] without anybody saying a single word." Narkiss told the same interviewer in October 1988:

I placed several buses in Jerusalem and in other cities [of the West Bank], written on them: "To Amman--Free of Charge." The bus used to carry them to the [partly] destroyed Allenby Bridge and then they would cross it [to Jordan]. I spread the news about these buses through individuals with wide contacts with the inhabitants, such as members of trade unions and chambers of commerce....In this [bus] operation between 20 and 25 thousand people got out.220

According to the Jerusalem Diary of Sister Marie-Therese, on Sunday, 18 June 1967, Israeli soldiers forbidden to circulate during curfew, which will last all day tomorrow. Those who wish to go to 221 One of the extraordinary revelations made by Narkiss in connection with his transfer operation was the daily telephone calls he used to receive after the war from the dovish Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir--whose concerns were primarily the so-Jewish character of the Israeli state222;

Pinhas Sapir used to phone me twice a day, to ask: how many [Arabs] got out today? Is the number of the inhabitants of the West Bank diminishing? The number [of those being transported by the buses?] began with 600 and 700 persons a day, and then it began to decline until it reached a few scores, and after two or three months the [bus?] operation stopped.223

The statement of the President's office elicited wide publicity in Israel in November 1991 and surprised Israeli historians. Hertzog's claim that Anwar al-Khatib was a partner in such an organized operation of mass "transfer" was denied by the latter, who promptly convened a press conference at which he said that he only had asked Hertzog at their Ambassador Hotel meeting for the release of the consuls of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, all of whom had been detained by the Israeli army, and had asked Hertzog to permit 15 Jordanian officials, who had worked in Jerusalem, to reunite with their families living in Jordan. Al-Khatib added that he had been surprised, a few days after his meeting with Hertzog, to find out that the military administration had organized buses and trucks for mass transportation of Arabs to the Allenby Bridge.224

A former Israeli soldier described the "voluntary" and "humane" aspects of this operation in a November 1991 interview with Kol Ha'ir:

My job was to take their [each Palestinian's] thumb and immerse its edge in ink and fingerprint them on the departure statement....Every day tens of buses arrived. There were days on which it seemed to me that thousands were departing ....Although there were those departees who were leaving voluntarily, but there were also not a few people who were simply expelled....We forced them to sign. I will tell you how exactly this was conducted: [for instance] a bus [carrying men] was arriving and only men were getting off, I emphasise--only men, aged 20 to 70, accompanied by borderguard soldiers. We were told that these were saboteurs, fedayeen, and it would be better that they would be outside the state. They [the Arab men] did not want to leave, and were dragged from the buses while being kicked and hit by revolver butts.
By the time they arrived to my [signing] stall, they were usually already completely blurred [as a result of beatings] at this stage and did not care much about the signing. It seemed to them part of the process. In many cases the violence used against them was producing desirable results from our point of view. The distance between the border point and the [Allenby] Bridge was about 100 metres and out of fear they were crossing to the other side running; the borderguard men and the paratroopers were all the time in the vicinity. When someone refused to give me his hand [for finger printing] they came and beat him badly. Then I was forcibly taking his thumb, immersing it in ink and finger printing him. This way the refuseniks were removed....I have no doubt that tens of thousands of men were removed against their will.225

Between 1949 and 1967 the Palestinian population in the West Jordan Valley was dominated by

The residents of these camps had been driven out from present-day Israel in 1948-1949. During the 1967 hostilities or shortly after virtually all residents of these camps, approximately 50,000 people, fled or were expelled to the East Bank, along with more than 50 percent of the native rural

- to 10,778.226

In this context it is worth noting the reactions of two Israeli historians to the 1991 revelations surrounding the "transfer" operation of Hertzog, Lahat and Narkiss and to the relevance of this operation to the almost total de-population of the three refugee camps near Jericho. Uri Milstein had this to say:

I remember that 5 days after the Six Day War I was in Jericho. It was empty there fled. It is more likely that they [the Israeli army] drove them away. In the War of Independence [the 1948 war] there was no organized transfer, people [Israeli commanders] volunteered to carry it out on their own initiative. In the Six Day War there were similar situations. Many thought that we had not completed the job in the War of Independence. It is known that there was a plan to conquer Qalqilya [town] and destroy it. There was also a plan to carry out transfer in Hebron as a revenge for the massacre [of Jews] in [19]29. I have not read about the evacuation of 200 thousand refugees in buses and I am not aware that this has been published anywhere.

Meir Pa'il stated:

This story is new to me, but this does not mean that it is incorrect, particularly in the light of the facts that the refugee camps in Jericho ['Ayn Sultan, Nu'ayma and 'Aqbat Jabir] were emptied of their residents in one-two weeks after the Six Day War. The travel route of the buses, which operated as described here, from the Damascus Gate to the Allenby Bridge, had to pass via the Jericho valley and the large refugee camps that were there and this is another confirmation of the story. If one of the four men: President Hertzog, Shlomo Lahat, his deputy Shmuel Albak, or 'Uzi Narkiss, confirms this thing, then this story is true and genuine.227

Strafing and firing on refugee columns were in fact reported in the foreign press. According to The Guardian Times of 22 June 1967 reported that
sing the crossing [of the Jordan River] introduced a dangerous new element today [21 June] by firing their submachine-guns over the heads of the straggling line of refugees......This disturbing feature is that there was no obvious point to this display of strength. The refugees were already bewildered enough and to risk causing a panic among already frightened

Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were expelled from the occupied territories during and after the June 1967 war. In his investigation of the 1967 exodus, William Wilson Harris (who also made no mention of the "transfer" activities of Hertzog, Lahat and Narkiss), estimated that of a pre-war population of approximately 1.4 million, about 430,000 left the territories occupied in the war (including the Golan Heights and Sinai) between June and December 1967. Most of these refugees left in June 1967. He pointed out that the 1967 refugee exodus varied from one region to another: over 90,000 people (almost 90 percent of the population) fled the Golan Heights, while the Gaza Strip lost less than 20 percent of its 400,000 residents. There were also local variations in the West Bank and a complex mix of responsible factors. The high population losses in some regions were the result of a "psychological legacy of pre-war events, a legacy of assorted fears," for instance, in the Hebron district and in the region surrounding the village of Qibya (situated about midway between the Latrun salient and Qalqilya) in the West Bank, where the Israeli army had carried out a large and infamous massacre in October 1953, in which 65 villagers were (mostly women and children) killed. Another example was in the Latrun salient where the residents of Yalu, `Imwas, and Bayt Nuba were ordered to leave their villages by the Israeli army and the chain-reaction effect of their movement across the West Bank can be traced in the higher losses from other villages on the Latrun-Ramallah-Jerusalem highway.

Encouragement of Arab departure by the Israeli authorities was also reported in the Hebrew press and foreign press. According to the daily Davar of 13 June 1967, many of those who had left the West Bank claimed that the Israeli authorities were forcing residents of Jenin, Qalqilya and Tulkarm (the so-... The daily Haaretz of 20 June 1967 reported that those who had left their homes on the West Bank had not been allowed to return. The New York Times of 26 August 1967 reported that each day for the last two weeks some 500 residents had left the Gaza Strip, adding that "Any reduction in Gaza area's population is a benefit to everyone in Israel's view." Several months later, The Observer (London) reported on 17 December 1967:

The opportunity of reprisals on security grounds has been taken to hasten the departure of more people from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and to prevent the return of those who had fled. The Israeli authorities believe that whatever the eventual political status of the Gaza Strip, the refugees there should be moved elsewhere.

The Observer of 28 January 1968 also reported: "It is estimated that between 30,000 and 35,000 people have left the [Gaza] Strip as a result of the measures taken by the Israeli authorities." The Guardian Middle East correspondent Michael Adams wrote: "No Israeli, when he deals frankly with you (and many do) will deny that he would prefer to accept 'the dowry without the bride,' meaning that, from Israel's point of view, the ideal solution to the problem of the occupied territories would be their absorption by Israel but without their Arab population.

In addition to the active encouragement of Arab departure, the Israeli army took tough measures to prevent the return of those who had fled during the war or shortly after. After the war, Israeli troops on the Jordan River apparently routinely shot civilians trying to slip back home on the
West Bank.\textsuperscript{231} A statement made by an anonymous soldier, who had served in the 5th Reserve Division on the Jordan River, and was issued from the Tel Aviv office of Hebrew magazine *Ha'olam Hazeh* on 10 September 1967, read:

\begin{quote}
we fired such shots every night on men, women and children. Even during moonlit nights when we could identify the people, that is--distinguish between men, women and children. In the mornings we searched the area and, by explicit order from the officer on the spot, shot the living, including those who hid, or were wounded (again: including the women and children).\textsuperscript{232}
\end{quote}

General `Uzi Narkiss, the Commanding General of the Central Command, 1965-68, also told an interviewer in October 1988 that after the 1967 war the Israeli troops on the Jordan River killed civilians trying to slip home on the West Bank.\textsuperscript{233}

\textbf{VII) Conclusion: 1967, Why Did the Palestinians Leave?}

1) The 1967 exodus was, in part, a response to the severe situational pressures existing at the time. The pressures were generated by the Israeli aerial attacks upon these territories, including the extensive use of napalm;
2) The occupation of the West Bank villages and towns by the Israeli army, and the actions of the occupying forces. Certainly the most drastic of these actions was the evictions of civilians and the village of Habla, al-Burj, and Jiftlik], and the initial and partial destruction of Qalqilya;
3) Other actions, such as threats and the mass detention of male civilians, also created situational pressures;
4) There were other indirect reasons: the Palestinian villagers were ill-prepared to resist and cope with these situational pressures;
5) They were ill-informed and unfamiliar with the terrifying nature of the aerial attacks;
6) Some Palestinians left to protect their family, particularly the honour of their womenfolk;

The extensive use of loudspeakers in the main cities to encourage departure for Amman is also well-documented;
8) The high population losses in some regions were the result of a "psychological legacy of pre-war events, a legacy of assorted fears," for instance, in the Hebron district and in the region surrounding the village of Qibya in the West Bank, where the Israeli army had carried out a large and infamous massacre in October 1953, in which 65 villagers (mostly women and children) were killed;
9) Another example was in the Latrun area where the over 6,000 residents of Yalu, 'Imwas, and Bayt Nuba were ordered to leave their villages by the Israeli army and the chain-reaction effect of their movement across the West Bank can be traced in the higher losses from other villages on the Latrun-Ramallah-Jerusalem highway.

\textbf{Epilogue:}

There is a consensus among the Zionist parties in Israel-- from Meretz on the left through the Labour and Likud parties and on to the extreme right--pre-1967 borders. Even liberal Israelis, such as Meron Benvenisti (deputy mayor of Jerusalem from some refugees in the West Bank and Gaza.\textsuperscript{234} In the final status negotiations the basic premises of the position of the Labour government are likely to be as follows: Israel will still refuse to recognise orically reject any return
of refugees based on UN Resolution 194 of 1948 or on any other international resolutions. Israel will also refuse to commit itself to admitting a fixed number or an annual quota of the 1948 refugees to the pre-1967 borders within a family reunion scheme. Israel will maintain that family reunion since 1948 has been a unilateral Israeli decision, based on purely humanitarian considerations, and that every application will be considered on its own merit. Even if Israel agrees to allow reunification of families based on humanitarian considerations, it will insist on being the only authority to decide who, how many, when and how they will be allowed to enter the country.

Central arguments to keep in mind:

i) The Palestinian refugee exodus of 1948 was the culmination of over half a century of efforts, secret (Zionist) plans and (in the end) brute force.

ii) The primary responsibility of the Zionist (Jewish) leadership for the displacement and dispossession of three-quarters of a million Palestinian refugees in 1948. Israel was primarily responsible for the Palestinian nakba. The 1948 exodus was largely the deliberate creation of Jewish leaders (especially Ben-Gurion) and military commanders.

iii) The Palestinian refugee problem has been at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1948. Comprehensive durable settlement/lasting peace will depend on addressing the refugee problem seriously.

iv) It was mainly the Palestinian refugees themselves who publicly resisted and opposed resolution 194 of December 1948.

v) - not return and the determination to remove the problem from the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

vi) Haq al-Awda central to the national reconstitution. Only by understanding the centrality of the nakba and expulsion that befell return.

vii) As far as the Palestinians are concerned, the wrong done to them can only be righted, and the disasters ended, through a return to their homeland and restitution of property.

viii) Since the mass expulsions of 1948 the Palestinians and the Arab states have demanded that the Palestinian refugees be given a free choice between repatriation and/or compensation, in line with the international consensus enshrined in UN Resolution 194 of December 1948.

ix) The trauma of the nakba has remained central to Palestinian society of today (in the same way that the Holocaust has been central to Israeli and Jewish society.) Today, the aspirations and hopes of millions of Palestinian refugees (in the diaspora, in the West Bank and Gaza and even some 250,000 internal refugees in Israel), are linked to the catastrophe of 1948.

x) Since the mid-1950 all Israeli governments have, in effect, refused to admit any responsibility for monetary compensation to the Palestinian refugees.

xi) Any genuine reconciliation between the two peoples (peace between peoples as opposed to a political settlement achieved by leaders) could only begin by Israel and most Israelis taking responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem, the displacement and dispossession of the refugees.

xii) Acknowledging the nakba/official apology by Israel: Holocaust denial is abhorrent; in some European countries Holocaust denial is a crime. Acknowledging the nakba (expulsion of the Palestinians in 1948, the deliberate destruction of hundreds of Palestinian towns and villages, the numerous massacres of 1948; and acknowledging the enormous suffering of the refugees for over half a century) would be very helpful. But this would not be sufficient.
Taking responsibility also means admitting responsibility for monetary compensation, including restitution of property and start making reparation.
Notes


8. (London, 1951, pp.160-161


10. Ibid.


14. David Ben-

15. Ibid.


17. David Ben-Gurion, Yoman Hamilhamah [War Diary], vol.1, entry dated 6 February 1948, p.211

18. -Din Vehesbon Male, 21 July-7 August


20. Cited in Yosef Gorny, Zionism and the Arabs, p.304. support for Arab transfer is also found in his writings. See Berl Katznelson, Ketavim [Writings] (Tel Aviv, 1949), vol.12, pp.241, 244. See also Anita Shapira, Berl: The Biography of a Socialist Zionist, p.335.


22. Weitz Diary, A246/7, entry dated 17 July 1941, p.1204, CZA.

23. Ibid., entry dated 20 March 1941, p.1127.

24. Weitz Diary, A246/7, entry dated 18 April 1948, p.2358, CZA.


26. Ibid., pp.93-199.

Ibid.

Ibid., p.2.

See Guy Erlich in , 6 May 1992.

Quoted in Ibid.


Ibid., p.229.

Guy Erlich in , 6 May 1992.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., p.119.

Ibid., 120.

http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20000/19/wl/mideast_massacre_1.htm


Palestinian Catastrophe

*Arab Studies Quarterly* 3, no.2 (Spring 1981), pp.123-51.

See Guy Erlich in , 6 May 1992.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*.


In the 1950s and the early 1960s there was a minority of left-wing and liberal Zionists, represented by the Mapam Party and the small group of Ihud, who were prepared to accept the absorption of a very limited number of refugees in Israel within the framework of an overall peace settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. See, for instance, New Outlook (December 1961), p. 9.

This and several other Israeli allegations have been examined and discredited as being part of an Israeli disinformation campaign. See article in The Spectator, 12 May 1961; Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem; Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Reality; Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis (New York: The Free Press, 1986); Ilan Pappe, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1992); Masalha, Expulsion of the Palestinians, pp.173-199.

According to the UN Technical Committee on Refugees, the number of Palestinian refugees in 1992 was some 2.7 million. According to United Nations Relief and Works Agency, the number of Palestinian refugees in 1992 was 1.415 million.


Quoted in al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 16 October 1993.

Shlomo Gazit, The Palestinian Refugee Problem (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, 1995), p.10.


Cited in ibid., p.164.

Cited in Morris, 1948 and After, p. 257.

Ibid., pp. 258-59.

Cited by Yehuda Litani in Hadashot, 7 December 1990.


See Morris, 1948 and After, p.134.


Gazit, The Palestinian Refugee Problem, p.11.

Ibid., pp.61-2.


Morris, pp.135-37.


90 *Haaretz*, 30 April 1958.


92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

94 Israeli State Archives (ISA), Foreign Ministry, 2401/19a.


97 ISA, Foreign Ministry, 2401/21.

98 ISA, Foreign Ministry, 2401/21b.

99 Segev, *1949*, p.64.

100


104 Segev, *1949*, p.46.

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid. pp.46-47.

107 Ibid. p.47.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid. p.47.


112 Quoted in Morris, *Israel's Border Wars*, pp.157-58.

113 Ibid., p.138.

114 Ibid., p.154.

115 Ibid.

116 Ibid., p.155.

117 Ibid., pp.155-56.

118 Ibid., p.157.

119 Ibid.

120 Cited in Maddrell, *The Beduin of the Negev*, p.6.


123 Quoted in Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, p.258, n.32.
Quoted in Maddrell, *The Beduin of the Negev*, p. 7.


Quoted in Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, pp. 140-41. Some of the inaccuracies found in this book concerning army ranks and units may have been the result of the fact that this book originally was translated from Hebrew into Arabic and then from Arabic into English.

Quoted in ibid., p. 141.

Ibid., p. 142.

See Yehuda Litani in *Hadashot*, 7 December 1990, p. 4.

Morris, *Israel’s Border Wars*, pp. 11-12.

Quoted in Rosenthal, "Operation Hafarferet."


Quoted in Rosenthal, "Operation Hafarferet."

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid

Quoted in Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, pp. 141-42.

Quoted in Rosenthal, "Operation Hafarferet."

Ibid

Quoted in Rosenthal, "Operation Hafarferet."


Quoted in ibid., pp. 17-18.


Palumbo, *Imperial Israel*, p. 32.

See Ronal Fisher in , 4 August 1995; and , 18 August 1995.

, 4 August 1995; and Haim Baram in *Middle East International*, 25 August 1995, p. 9

, 4 August 1995.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Yitzhak Rabin, *Pinkas Sherut* (Service Notebook; memoirs written in collaboration with Dov


Israeli estimates range from 173,000 to 200,000 while Jordanian and Palestinian estimates

*The Palestinians Displaced and the Peace Negotiations* (Ramallah, West Bank: Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre, 1996), p. 21. The real figure is probably somewhere around 300,000 people.


161. Ibid.
162. Ibid; Avidan, Davar, 2 June 1987.
164. Ibid.
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid.
168. , 2 June 1985, p.2; Nisan, , pp.119 and 200.
170. See , 2 June 1985, p 2; Mordechai Nisan, [The Jewish State and the Arab Problem], (Jerusalem: Rubin Press, 1987), pp.119 and 200.
175. (Tel Aviv, Schocken, 1973).
177. Yanai held important functions in the Haganah HQ; formerly, First Commander of the Signal Corps; formerly, Deputy Director General of the Defence Ministry.
179. Ibid., p.40.
180. Ibid., pp.45-6.
181. Benziman, Yerushalayim, p.41.
182. On the central role played by Kollek in the destruction of the quarter, see ibid., pp.40-1.
184. Benziman, Yerushalayim, p.42.
185. Ibid., pp.43.
186. Ibid., pp.45-6.
187. Ibid., p.45.


193. Reconstruct Emmaus (St-Sulpice, Switzerland, Association for the Reconstruction of Emmaus, December 1987), p.3.


198. Yalu and Bayt Nuba was sent to all Knesset members. An English version of the report was also published in *Reconstruct Emmaus*, pp.7-8.

199. Jerusalem Diary of Sister Marie-Therese, in *Cahiers du Temoignage Chretien*.


203. Ibid., p.96.


207. These figures were cited by John Reddaway, Deputy Commissioner General of UNRWA, in *Daily Star*, 21 July 1967. See also Ian Gilmour and Dennis Walters, in *The Times*, 27 July 1967.

208. Based on personal communication by Dr Anis Kassim, originally a resident of Qalqilya and currently lives in Amman. See also Dib and Jabber, *Occupied Territories*, pp.228 and 235.


213. Cited in Nisan, , p.117.


215. Ibid.
some 60,000

Jabir.

221. Jerusalem Diary of Sister Marie-Therese, in Cahiers du Temoignage Chretien.


223. Ibid.


225. Ibid.


228. Harris, Taking Root, p.21. In October 1953, Unit 101, commanded by Ariel Sharon, attacked a settlement. Jordan had condemned the Arab perpetrators and offered its co-operation to track them down.

completed its operation described what they found:

Bullet-riddled bodies near the doorways and multiple bullet hits on the doors of the demolished houses indicated that the inhabitants had been forced to remain inside until their homes were blown up over them. Witnesses were uniform in describing their experience as a night of horrors, during which Israeli soldiers moved about in their village blowing the buildings, firing into doorways and windows with automatic weapons and throwing grenades.

Cited in E.H. Hutchinson, Violent Truce (New York, Devin-Adair, 1956), pp.152-8. Commander Hutchinson was an American UN observer. In the biographical sketches of his diary, Meir Har-Tzion stayed [in the village] for three hours, destroyed 42 houses and as a result 70 residents, most of whom were women and children. For further discussion of the Qibya episode, see B. Morris, 1949-1956 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993), pp.225-262.

229. Harris, Taking Root, p.22.


231. McDowall, Palestine and Israel, pp.204 and 302, n.109.
